

# Current History

A WORLD AFFAIRS MONTHLY

MAY, 1971

## EAST EUROPE, 1971

### EAST AND WEST EUROPE: A CONTINENT DIVIDED

*Andrzej Korbonski* 257

THE UNITED STATES AND EAST EUROPE . *Roger S. Whitcomb* 263

### NEW COURSE IN COMMUNIST-RULED POLAND?

*Richard F. Staar* 269

YUGOSLAVIA'S FUTURE ..... *Stephen S. Anderson* 276

CZECHOSLOVAKIA THREE SPRINGS LATER . *Vaclav E. Mares* 282

HUNGARY: THE POLITICS OF REFORM ..... *Charles Gati* 290

GERMAN POLICY TOWARD EAST EUROPE . *Robert G. Wesson* 295

CURRENT DOCUMENTS • *President Nixon on European Détente* 302

BOOKS ON EAST EUROPE ..... 303

THE MONTH IN REVIEW ..... 309

MAP • *East Central Europe* ..... Inside Back Cover

# Current History

FOUNDED IN 1914

MAY, 1971  
VOLUME 60 NUMBER 357

## Editor:

CAROL L. THOMPSON

## Assistant Editors:

MARY M. ANDERBERG

JOAN B. ANTELL

## Editorial Assistant:

JEAN HANSEN

•

## Contributing Editors:

ROSS N. BERKES

University of Southern California

RICHARD BUTWELL

The National War College

MICHAEL T. FLORINSKY

Columbia University, Emeritus

HANS W. GATZKE

Yale University

MARSHALL I. GOLDMAN

Wellesley College

NORMAN A. GRAEBNER

University of Virginia

OSCAR HANDLIN

Harvard University

STEPHEN D. KERTESZ

University of Notre Dame

NORMAN D. PALMER

University of Pennsylvania

CARROLL QUIGLEY

Georgetown University

JOHN P. ROCHE

Brandeis University

A. L. ROWSE

All Souls College, Oxford

ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN

University of Pennsylvania

HARRY R. RUDIN

Yale University

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN

Portland State College

RICHARD VAN ALSTYNE

University of the Pacific

COLSTON E. WARNE

Amherst College

ARTHUR P. WHITAKER

University of Pennsylvania, Emeritus

•

## President and Publisher:

DANIEL G. REDMOND, JR.

## Vice President:

ELBERT P. THOMPSON

# Coming Next Month

## THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF JUSTICE

Our June, 1971, issue begins a three-part symposium devoted to a study of justice in the United States. In this first issue, seven specialists will describe the framework of the system of justice in the United States as it operates on a national, state and local level.

### The Roots of the American Judicial System

by FRANCIS ALLEN, Dean, Michigan Law School

### The System of State and Local Courts in America

by HENRY ROBERT GLICK, Florida State University

### The System of Federal Courts

by WILLIAM M. BEANEY, University of Denver Law School

### Law Enforcement: State and Local

by VIRGIL W. PETERSON, Visiting Lecturer, University of Illinois

### The U.S. Department of Justice

by JOHN ELLIFF, Barnard College

### The U.S. Prison System Yesterday and Today

by JOHN P. CONRAD, U.S. Department of Justice

### The U.S. Jury System

by MORRIS BLOOMSTEIN, author of "The Jury System"

## Also Coming . . .

AMERICAN JUSTICE at WORK, July, 1971

IMPROVING JUSTICE in AMERICA, August, 1971

**HIGH SCHOOL DEBATERS:** Note these 3 issues on the 1971-1972 N.U.E.A. Debate Topic

Published monthly by Current History, Inc., 4225 Main St., Phila., Pa. 19127. Second Class Postage paid at Phila., Pa., and additional mailing offices. Indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*. Individual copies may be secured by writing to the publication office. No responsibility is assumed for the return of unsolicited manuscripts. Copyright, © 1971, by Current History, Inc.

\$1.00 a copy • \$9.50 a year • Canada \$10.00 a year • Foreign \$10.50 a year

Please see back cover for quantity purchase rates.

**NO ADVERTISING**

# Current History

MAY, 1971

VOL. 60, NO. 357

*How strong and independent are the nations of East Europe? How significant are the moves toward a European détente? As our introductory article points out, "one could argue that . . . the chasm between East and West Europe remains today as wide as ever. In the East, the lifting of the curtain was followed by the rediscovery of ancient links with West Europe and the resurrection of an all-European ethos. However, the period of exhilaration did not last very long. The initial excitement . . . gave way to a growing realization that the two sections of the continent had little in common except geography."*

## East and West Europe: A Continent Divided

BY ANDRZEJ KORBONSKI

*Associate Professor of Political Science, University of California at Los Angeles*

**T**O WRITE SOMETHING NEW or original about the relationship between East and West Europe in the last 25 years is an almost impossible task. Modern historians, political scientists, economists and specialists in international affairs have written thousands of pages analyzing various aspects of intra-European relations during that period.

In view of this situation, one must look once again at certain changes (or lack of them) which have taken place on the European continent since the end of World War II. In doing so one runs the risk of belaboring the obvious, and yet there are a number of misconceptions about Europe, both East and West, which have been widely accepted by the general public and have frequently been elevated to the status of dogmas.

One of these misconceptions is the belief that the division of Europe dates to 1945 and that prior to that date the continent was for

the most part united in the broadest sense of the word. A corollary seems to be the conviction that both parts of Europe could and would be reunited if only the artificial barriers imposed by the Soviet Union were raised, whereupon the process of European reunification would take place automatically. This conviction seems to represent a fallacy accompanied by a healthy dose of wishful thinking.

The division of Europe did not begin at Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam; its origins go back at least to the period of the industrial revolutions of the nineteenth century. It was all very well for Winston Churchill to go to Fulton, Missouri, in 1946 and to coin the memorable phrase about the "iron curtain" stretching from the Baltic to the Adriatic. The fact remains that a curtain separated the two areas of Europe long before the Red Army reached the banks of the Elbe in 1945.

A quick look at interwar Europe confirms

this broad generalization. Politically East Europe, excluding the U.S.S.R., chose authoritarian régimes of various hues and intensities before World War II, after some initial flirtation with democracy. West Europe succeeded to a large extent in preserving democratic forms of government. To be sure, there were exceptions but, by and large, this was the state of affairs on the eve of World War II.

Economically, the contrast was even more striking. Except for the Soviet Union, which began in the late 1920's to industrialize at a rapid pace, the rest of East Europe was predominantly agrarian in contrast to the West, where the industrial revolution was largely accomplished decades ago. The differences in the levels of economic development were closely tied to the social and political systems of both parts of Europe and managed to reinforce one another, contributing to the maintenance of the status quo and the resulting division of the continent.

There were also other differences. Prior to 1939, East Europe consisted of countries which were either nonexistent before 1914 or which underwent major systemic changes as a result of World War I. As a result, most of their energy was spent on the process of nation-building. Often with artificially drawn frontiers, faced with serious problems of ethnic and racial minorities, most if not all the East European countries barely managed to survive as independent entities.

### **DIVIDED EUROPE**

All of this was accentuated by the persistence of old—and the emergence of new—international conflicts which gave additional impetus to the growth of fierce nationalism, frequently transformed into blind chauvinism. Thus, by 1939, East Europe was in the state of near anarchy which made it especially vulnerable to attacks from both within and without.

West Europe again provided a contrast. The process of nation-building had been accomplished there long before various ethnic and class cleavages appeared. Thereupon, they were handled by and large in a demo-

cratic fashion and, while the area did not display a high degree of unity, there was undoubtedly an overall sense of West European identity.

Thus it is not surprising that the relations between both parts of Europe prior to 1939 could hardly be termed close. As a follow-up of World War I, the dominant West European power, France, attempted to create a network of military alliances embracing some East European countries; the alliances, however, remained largely on paper. In the field of economics, East Europe supplied West Europe with cheap raw materials and foodstuffs in return for expensive capital equipment and manufactured goods. The trade pattern was typical of modern trade between developed and underdeveloped countries.

To a very large extent, however, the nations of East Europe in the prewar period found themselves in a far more difficult situation than the countries of the Third World find themselves in today. There were no foreign aid programs, no World Bank credits, no United Nations development aid and no private investors willing to risk their government-insured capital abroad. Having contributed largely to the creation of a multi-state East Europe, West European powers like Great Britain and France were unwilling to provide the East Europeans with the means of survival; instead they took advantage of the favorable terms of trade and cheap labor flowing from East to West. The only country which showed serious interest in the area was Germany, which made considerable inroads both politically and economically.

There was still another curtain or wall separating the two areas of Europe—ignorance. The average Frenchman or Englishman knew infinitely more about Africa and Asia than about countries of East Europe which he usually saw as Ruritania ruled by operetta princes. On the other hand, the Czech or Rumanian elites, members of whom had often been educated in the West, looked toward Vienna and Paris for leadership and guidance in almost everything. For the overwhelming majority of the East European population, however, the United States ap-



peared more familiar than West Europe.

Thus, on the eve of World War II, the European continent consisted of two distinct areas which had little in common except for the accident of geography.

Paradoxically, it was World War II which for a few years managed to create a semblance of European unity. German military successes, followed by the occupation and subjugation of most of the continent, resulted in the establishment of a quasi-European empire stretching from Spain into Russia and from Norway to Sicily and Crete. To be sure, this was a hollow unity based on mass terror and the force of arms, yet it went much farther than a similar effort by Napoleon more than a century before.

With the collapse of Nazi Germany, Europe once again returned to the status quo. This time, however, new factors made the old chasm dividing the continent even deeper, or so it seemed.

The story of the last 25 years is so familiar that it need not be repeated here. In East Europe, the first decade of the postwar period witnessed the creation of the apparently impregnable Moscow-controlled monolithic empire. While the individual East European countries remained on the map as independent entities, for all practical purposes they became Soviet satellites, ruled by Stalin-appointed viceroys. It was a fair guess that it was only a matter of time before all these countries would be absorbed politically and economically into the Soviet Union.

The process of integration in West Europe took much longer and, at least on the surface, it never reached the kind of unification achieved east of the Elbe. Nevertheless, organizations such as the Marshall Plan, NATO, the Iron and Steel Community, and the West European Payments Union laid the foundations for future unity which, in the final analysis, was to prove stronger and more enduring than unity in the East.

For 25 years relations between the two Europes were for all practical purposes nonexistent. The onset of the cold war eliminated the remaining vestiges of the traditional links which had been partly restored at the

end of World War II. The establishment of the United States-sponsored embargo on East-West trade and the creation of the Soviet-inspired Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) reduced commercial relations to a trickle. Cultural relations, never very extensive, came to a virtual halt. Even conventional diplomatic relations ceased to exist except when absolutely necessary.

Each part of the continent, armed to the teeth, was watching the other across the demarcation line. Traditional ignorance, reinforced by massive propaganda campaigns on either side, was responsible for the gradual widening of the old gap. The process of polarization was also accompanied by a growing mutual misunderstanding of the changes that had been taking place in both East and West. As a result, even relatively well-informed and sophisticated observers had to assume that both sides were drifting farther and farther apart and that the iron curtain would remain indefinitely.

From the hindsight of 15 years it is clear that the assumptions were wrong. The Communist monolith did not survive Stalin, and the next decade witnessed several Soviet attempts to maintain a modicum of unity by replacing Stalinist terror and charisma with a variety of formal devices like the Warsaw Pact and the revived Comecon. By the time of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's ouster in 1964, some semblance of unity had been restored, but it was still a far cry from the old monolith. The new "socialist commonwealth" was full of cracks and, more significantly, more and more holes were being punched in the iron curtain which, in the mid-1960's, began to resemble a chicken-wire screen.

Developments in the West took a somewhat different path. On the one hand, the signing of the Treaty of Rome created the European Economic Community (E.E.C.) whose success exceeded all expectations. On the other, the very success of E.E.C. carried with it seeds of disunity as West Europe became eventually divided between "The Six" and the rest. Simultaneously, the growing stature of French President Charles de Gaulle

began to dominate the scene at the expense of the United States, which had heretofore served as a catalyst of Western unity. Thus, in the middle of the 1960's, West Europe, like East Europe, also appeared to be in a state of disarray.

### INTRA-EUROPEAN REVIVAL

During this period, intra-European relations showed a considerable revival, especially compared to the previous decade. Perhaps the most important aspect of this renaissance was the mutual desire to bridge the ignorance gap. It must be kept in mind that since the end of World War II both parts of Europe have developed along different paths and at different rates. East Europe went through a period of industrial revolution which brought it closer in many respects to West Europe. The latter, however, did not stand still and, with some exceptions, showed an impressive pattern of economic growth.

The first step toward improved relations was the attempt to bridge the ignorance gap. Thus the initial impetus was provided by mushrooming scholarly and cultural exchanges and visits and the expansion of tourist traffic.

The impact of this peaceful confrontation should not be underestimated. The impact was probably greater in the East, which soon became conscious of the significant differences in the standard and style of life between the two sections of Europe. It can be surmised that the partial lifting of the curtain added fuel to the existing ferment and to the growing dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in Communist Europe. To put it simply, while most East Europeans always believed that the distant United States embodied all their dreams, few of them expected to see a highly prosperous and free France and Italy which, after all, were located on the same continent.

The West Europeans visiting East Europe quickly realized that, despite more than a decade of Communist rule, they could still communicate with their counterparts and that, in general, except in the field of economics, they shared traditional European values and beliefs. Many West Europeans returned home convinced that perhaps the

division of Europe was more artificial than real.

The revival of cultural relations was accompanied by an expansion of economic contacts. In contrast to the Americans, the West Europeans had no compunction about trading with the Communists and they grew increasingly impatient with the United States-sponsored embargo. Eventually, the restrictions were almost completely abandoned, and the West European exporters—spearheaded by West Germany—became engaged in serious trading with the East, which provided an expanding market for just about every product the West had to offer.

Thus, in the mid-1960's, economic and cultural relations between the two Europes improved to such an extent that a number of people began to believe that the next step—political rapprochement—was simply inevitable.

There were after all good reasons for such an assumption. In the West it became clear that Charles de Gaulle was determined to reduce, if not completely eliminate, West Europe's dependence on the United States. His global plans included a similar arrangement for East Europe, whereby Soviet influence there was also to be restricted. As a result, the new Europe under the French leadership was to provide the "third force," interposing itself between the superpowers.

France's rejection of Great Britain's bid to enter the Common Market and her semi-withdrawal from NATO were accompanied by de Gaulle's visits to Moscow, Warsaw and Bucharest, where he was welcomed as a symbol of the new Europe. Simultaneously, French credits became available to the various East European countries which proceeded to expand their trade with France and other E.E.C. countries interested in closer commercial relations.

### DE GAULLE'S INITIATIVES

There is little doubt that de Gaulle's timing in taking the initiative in the direction of European unity was highly propitious. United States preoccupation with Vietnam and its increasing domestic difficulties diverted Wash-

ington's attention from Europe. The Soviet Union, faced with the continuing challenge of China and its own persisting economic problems, appeared unwilling or unable to prevent West European penetration of its East European domain. Thus although the superpowers probably resented de Gaulle's determination to assert his European leadership, they did not choose, at least for the time being, to stop him from forging links between the two sections of Europe.

The climate of opinion on the continent also seemed to favor closer contacts. The clear-cut success of the E.E.C. gave its members renewed confidence in their economic power, which they intended to use in the East. At the same time de Gaulle's European ethos appealed to most segments of the West European society. The older generation, always secretly resentful of United States domination, supported the French initiative as symbolic of Europe's resumption of its role as a major actor in the international arena. The younger elites, openly critical of United States policy in Southeast Asia, also favored rapprochement with the East.

In the background, there was the growing consensus that the danger of war with the Soviet Union, which dominated every facet of life in West Europe after 1945, was rapidly fading. This threat of armed confrontation, which was responsible for NATO and the continuing United States presence on the continent, had inhibited any opening to the East.

It soon became clear that de Gaulle's policy found a highly positive response in the East. To begin with, the charisma of de Gaulle struck a sympathetic chord in the hearts of the older generation which for years has looked toward a leader—preferably a military figure—who could guide its destiny. Moreover, de Gaulle's unabashed, romantic nationalism added fuel to the traditional East European nationalism which had been smoldering under the surface for the last two decades. Finally, the magnet of France as a cultural and artistic leader appealed strongly to the East European intelligentsia. On a more pragmatic level, the increase in East-West

trade was warmly welcomed by East Europe, which had begun to experience economic difficulties after 20 years of rapid growth.

Thus, in the late 1960's, it appeared that the old chasm which separated the two Europes was rapidly being bridged. De Gaulle's visits to East European capitals were followed by pilgrimages of major and minor East European leaders to Paris. The seeming success of the French initiative inspired West Germany to jump on the bandwagon and to seek closer relations with her former enemies in the East.

The United States, although officially proclaiming repeatedly its desire to build bridges to East Europe, did not actively participate in the West European efforts to move toward all-European unity.

The Soviet attitude was highly ambivalent. On the one hand, Moscow probably applauded de Gaulle's declaration of independence from the United States as something the Kremlin had sought to promote for more than two decades. It can also be assumed that the U.S.S.R. did not object to the increase in East-West trade, which it considered an economic necessity. However, the Soviet leadership was probably less than happy with the political impact of the Franco-German initiative in East Europe. De Gaulle seemed to have found his counterpart in Rumanian Premier Nicolae Ceausescu; France's quasi-withdrawal from NATO was matched by Rumania's coolness toward the Warsaw Pact; and the success of the E.E.C. contributed to the growing dissatisfaction with Comecon and its overall economic performance, reflected in a string of economic reforms which attempted to remedy the situation.

It is commonly accepted today that the process of East European-West European rapprochement was suddenly interrupted by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968. To be sure, the shock caused by the intervention was great, albeit shortlasting. Two years later, in August, 1970, the Soviet-German treaty seemed to have restimulated the process of European détente. The Moscow treaty was followed by the recognition by West Germany of the Oder-Neisse Line, a

perennial stumbling bloc on the road to improved relations. Finally, it appeared that the European Security Conference, ostensibly aimed at the dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, would take place at a not too distant future. All this indicated that the gap was being closed once again.

And yet, one could argue that despite all the events enumerated above, the chasm between East and West Europe remains today as wide as ever.

In the East, the lifting of the curtain was followed by the rediscovery of ancient links with West Europe and the resurrection of an all-European ethos. However, the period of exhilaration did not last very long. The initial excitement of visiting Paris, Rome and London gave way to a growing realization that the two sections of the continent had little in common except geography.

The younger East European generation admired Western technology and high living standards but was much less impressed with West European political and social systems. Paradoxically enough, despite their (at best) lukewarm attitude toward communism, the East Europeans are invariably proud of their accomplishments of the last 25 years. Few if any East Europeans hankered for the return of capitalism; most of them were appreciative of the educational and employment opportunities available; and nearly all willy-nilly believed in the eventual victory of socialism.

In these circumstances, West Europe had little to offer. Furthermore, most East Europeans realized that they would once again be forced to take a back seat in the event of a united Europe. At least, in the present situation, countries such as Bulgaria or Rumania enjoyed a much more exalted status than they had in the past.

Economic relations between the two parts of Europe also offered little promise of closer integration. East Europe continued to supply West Europe with foodstuffs and raw materials in return for manufactured goods and capital equipment—a pattern of trade almost identical to that of the prewar period. The success of the E.E.C. also put obstacles in the way of closer economic integration by

erecting new barriers to East-West trade and by contributing to some degree to the strengthening of the coordination of East European economies under the aegis of Comecon.

The West European attitude toward possible unification with East Europe has also changed. De Gaulle's departure from the scene removed the one man who enjoyed considerable popularity in the East and, albeit less so, in the West. West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, although strongly committed to building bridges to the East, has not yet acquired the same symbolic status as the late Charles de Gaulle.

More important, however, West European public opinion appears to have lost interest in European unification. On the one hand, the invasion of Czechoslovakia clearly revealed the limits of East Europe's ability to conduct independent foreign and domestic policies. On the other hand, domestic difficulties experienced by such countries as Great Britain, France and Italy diverted the attention of these peoples and their governments from the question of closer relations with their neighbors to the East. And, finally, as in the case of East Europe, there was really little real incentive for the West Europeans to move in that direction.

This seems to be the crux of the matter. For years, the conventional wisdom has stated that the rapprochement, if not the unification, of East and West Europe would be a "good thing," and that it is "strongly desired by the people." Yet no concrete evidence has ever been offered to substantiate this claim. On a smaller scale, the same problem exists with regard to German unification. The fact re-

*(Continued on page 304)*

---

**Andrzej Korbonski**, author of *Politics of Socialist Agriculture in Poland: 1945-1960* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), did research on Soviet bloc economies at Columbia from 1956 to 1963. He is at work on two new books on East European politics and economics. In 1970-1971, he is at the Ford Foundation on leave from the University of California at Los Angeles.



---

---

*How relevant is United States policy in East Europe? As this author points out, "a rather sterile, uniform view of United States-European alliance commitments has tended to hinder the chances for a realistic adjustment of United States relationships with both the Soviet Union and East Europe."*

## The United States and East Europe

BY ROGER S. WHITCOMB

*Assistant Professor of Political Science, Kutztown State College*

ONE CANNOT COME to grips with contemporary American foreign policy toward East Europe without addressing the larger European framework, of which the United States, by choice, and the East Europeans, by necessity, are an integral part. Such is the conditioning reality of United States-East European relations. Some preliminary observations of that larger context, therefore, are in order.

The *grundnorm* of European politics is that more than 25 years after the close of World War II, Europe remains a house divided against itself. As the major arena for the postwar Soviet-American confrontation, Europe's major security issues are unresolved. In the interim, both major contestants in the dispute have lent their energies to promoting and elaborating their respective spheres of influence in that divided continent.

This imperative has been translated, in the case of the United States, into the creation and strengthening of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as its major security instrumentality in the area. At the same time, the United States has sought to encourage a separate but parallel development of a sense of community among the West European states, predicated largely on economic considerations. For the Soviet Union, the major goal has been to prevent the political and social penetration of East Europe by the West, thus insuring the continued efficacy of that

sector as a buffer zone in its strategic relationship with Germany and with the Western democracies.

This is neither the time nor the place to try to prove that both the United States and the Soviet Union have perhaps missed genuine opportunities substantially to mitigate, if not to solve, the cold war confrontation. Yet the fact remains that due largely to their collective failure to reach a settlement, a series of developments has been set in motion within Europe itself which represents a clear-cut break with the trends of the recent past. In specific terms, Europe is now in a state of ferment, reflected in its increased desire for economic self-sufficiency and in an acceleration of national independence of action. As contact among the several states of the divided continent has proliferated in recent months, a mutual desire for a normalization of relationships has developed. Most important, the two bloc leaders are increasingly unable to control their respective alliance partners.

Europe can no longer be viewed simply as a kind of continental institutionalization of the permanent hostility of the superpowers. Rather, increasingly and somewhat incongruously, a mixed-motive Europe of groping but imperfect partnership has appeared, with proliferating alignments and latent antagonisms. In sum, Europe's common denominator now seems to be a growing desire for

genuine political security, epitomized in the concept of *détente*.

If this distillation of the contemporary state of European politics is at all accurate, at the very least it portends for United States policy an awareness that the current decade of intra-European politics will be complex and uncertain and, therefore, potentially destabilizing. Consequently, the major task confronting the United States in its European policy in the 1970's will be to coordinate and manage the growing contacts between the two parts of the continent so that the increasingly competitive, bilateral approaches that mark its collective visions of *détente* do not generate unnecessary confusion.

On the basis of these observations, it follows that we should inquire how the United States is likely to respond to these events. What are the options available to our decision-makers in seeking to shape East European developments? What strategies and supporting tactics should the United States pursue in East Europe consonant with its own national interests and the realities of the overall European situation?

In an overview of the United States postwar record with regard to East Europe, some tentative generalizations can be made. In a larger sense, United States policy toward East Europe has been part and parcel of a remarkable decision-making syndrome which has long colored the actions of the United States within the international system. A set of policies are suspended in a precarious and often frustrating balance between two worlds: a world of aspirations and a world of practical politics.

In a special way, however, the East European policy of the United States has suffered from the lack of an integral relationship between strategy and diplomacy. Whether the issue has been European reconciliation or the integrity of West Europe, the defense of West Europe or arms control, German reunification or the Federal Republic's continuing role in the Western military alliance, invariably the solution has depended on the ability of the United States to harmonize its need for security with its positive goals. And in few

cases has this country's persistent inability to hold in view both short- and long-term objectives and to adjust their competing requirements been more evident than in its relations with the states of East Europe.

Thus it is entirely appropriate, at a time when the United States is seeking to reevaluate its global priorities in the wake of its withdrawal from Vietnam, to take a fresh look at its East European policy within the context of the overt West European orientation that the United States has chosen to adopt over the past score of years. For only the fact that the United States has tended to perceive East Europe, and to respond to events there, through the prism of its West European policies explains the curious mixture of inaction, contradiction and failure in United States relations with the East Europeans. A brief perusal of the postwar record in this regard would seem to warrant this conclusion.

#### THE POSTWAR AMERICAN APPROACH TO EAST EUROPE

After the disastrous 1947 Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference, it was evidently felt in Washington that the Soviets were not genuinely interested in reaching mutually satisfactory agreements on the German and Polish questions, and that it was perhaps Western weakness in Europe that was tempting the Soviets to play the devil's disciple in that part of the world. The result was the United States enunciation and elaboration of the so-called "containment" policy. Whatever its theoretical merits, containment, translated in operational terms, came to mean that a substantial effort to rebuild West European strength had to *precede* any further serious negotiation with the Soviet Union with regard to the status of East Europe.

Given the atmosphere of disillusionment after the wartime hopes of a reconciled humanity, this view of the nature of future negotiations may have been inevitable at that time. Nevertheless, an elaborate intellectual rationale eventually led the United States to the position that the "building of situations of strength" around the periphery of the Soviet

Union was the only practical approach to pursue with respect to the Soviet Union. American responsibility for subsequent events is clear. The institutionalization of the cold war—at least our contributing responsibility for the conflict—began at the moment when this first tenet of containment, originally conceived to be only the frame of reference, became the basis of American policy toward the Soviet Union. Specifically, the Soviets' rejection of Marshall Plan aid in 1947 for themselves and for the countries of East Europe under their control pushed the United States over the edge to the adoption of the definitive apolitical course toward the Communist world which has lain at the core of United States policy ever since.

Beginning in the spring of 1949, the overt militarization of containment, following hard on the heels of the provocative and reckless Soviet gambit in Berlin, put the capstone on this concept of the cold war. The subsequent complete militarization of the conflict in the decade of the 1950's marked the victory of this view of relations with the Communist bloc.

The difficulty with this view, of course, aside from its inherent contradictions in logic, was that it was precisely during the 1950's that the Soviet Union arrived at a measure of nuclear parity with the United States. This achievement not only began to condition the nuclear strategies of the two super-states but came to be reflected in their respective European alliance policies as well. A sort of collective hardening of the arteries set in as each side sought to consolidate its gains and to preserve its prerogatives on the European land mass. Meanwhile, the ideological confrontation which continued in Europe in effect patterned the political reconstruction of the continent. Reconstruction

was predicated on mutually exclusive models of the area which could be settled only by one side triumphing over the other.

This dual reality—the existence of a relative Soviet-American balance of power in Europe and the largely static view of negotiations entertained by both Washington and Moscow—has tended to dominate the great power approaches to East Europe for much of the postwar era and continues to do so. It is true that for a brief period in the early 1950's American policy, under the aegis of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, seemed to articulate a new, qualitatively different approach, verbalized as the "liberation" of East Europe. Semantics aside, the intellectual-moral shallowness and practical inefficacy of this view in the context of Soviet nuclear capability was quickly laid bare by American inaction in the Hungarian and Polish crises of 1956.

It was in reaction to those events, especially, that an ostensibly new United States policy began to be worked out—an approach thought to be substantially more relevant to post-Stalin developments in East Europe. Thus, United States doctrine began to form around the idea of fostering evolutionary change in East Europe. A policy of gradualism was evolved by Washington—one developed largely in the administration of John F. Kennedy, which reached full flower in the presidency of Lyndon Johnson. Since the mid-1960's, it has been variously labeled "peaceful engagement" or the "building of bridges" to the East. The ultimate objective of this tactic has been clearly stated: the reunification of Germany in the context of a larger European settlement.<sup>1</sup> Operationally, this is to be brought off by increased economic and social contact with the states of East Europe, though not to the point of unduly antagonizing the Soviet Union. It is also thought that continued United States support of West European security and community should serve as the jumping-off point in any negotiating process leading toward European reconciliation.<sup>2</sup>

The East Europeans have begun to look at their security interests and the meaning of

<sup>1</sup> Most clearly articulated by President Lyndon Johnson in an address before the National Conference of Editorial Writers in New York City, October 7, 1966, reprinted in *The Department of State Bulletin*, October 24, 1966, p. 623; see also in this vein a statement by Eugene V. Rostow, *The Department of State Bulletin*, January 2, 1967, p. 24.

<sup>2</sup> This view is put succinctly by Richard F. Pederson, State Department Counselor, *The Department of State Bulletin*, May 18, 1970, pp. 633-636.

the détente from a different perspective. Whereas the United States has become predisposed to view both security and détente in Europe in a way that favors the status quo, the East Europeans, by way of contrast, have come to view détente as reflecting a certain new flux in European relations and therefore as providing an opportunity to transform the political face of the area in their favor. Much like their West European counterparts, they have begun to believe that defense in the 1970's should represent more than mere security. Détente, for them, appears more and more to represent a process of solving the outstanding issues that continue to divide the continent. Détente, consequently, has involved a slow but perceptively clearer awareness on their part of the mutually adverse consequences of the great power concept of maintaining the status quo in Europe.

It is in this sense that the recent initiatives of the Rumanian Communist party can best be understood. Rumanian President Nicolae Ceausescu's foreign policy, like that of Yugoslavia's President Josip Tito, has amounted to a calculated rejection of the idea that the interest of world socialism must be the ultimate criterion for the foreign policy decision-making of a socialist country. Unlike the Yugoslav example, the Rumanian initiatives have introduced the revolutionary idea that "de-ideologization" of external relations may be an acceptable alternative for a Stalinist state.

It should be understood, too, that a primary motivation of the East Europeans in their growing interest in détente is economic—a desire to achieve a greater degree of independence of the Soviet Union in their respective national economies, as well as a need to improve their standards of living.

### THE STERILITY OF U.S. POLICY

In the light of these exigencies, a number of deductions and some critical analysis can be advanced. First, peace and security in Europe remain predicated almost exclusively

on the Soviet-United States confrontation of countervailing military force.

Second, while the resultant stalemate has created a period of relative peace and stability in Europe, it has not solved Europe's dilemmas.

Third, the United States takes a view of stability and security in Europe which is both hegemonic and static and, therefore, detrimental to the best interests of the majority of the states of that region.

Fourth, current notions of a negotiated settlement being entertained in the United States flow essentially from our perception of the necessity for preserving the strategic balance of power in Europe and the consequent stability attributable to the stalemated confrontation of the two military blocs. In the process, a rather sterile, uniform view of United States-European alliance commitments has tended to hinder the chances for a realistic adjustment of U.S. relationships with both the Soviet Union and East Europe.

As George Kennan has rightly suggested,<sup>3</sup> more is at stake for United States interests in Europe than the issue of German reunification, or even the welfare of NATO and West Europe; the welfare of East Europe is also involved, and the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union are intimately bound up with the disposition of Europe as a whole. In contrast to this more far-sighted vision of a united Europe, every United States President since Harry S. Truman has been content, for all practical purposes, to look forward to a strong and united West Europe. Opting for the entanglement of West European economic collaboration with military obligations involving an attendant prejudice against the extension of the institutions of co-operation to the whole continent, United States decision-makers have sought actively the further elaboration of these institutions in a West European framework. They have welcomed the gradual meshing of West Europe's economic ties with local and trans-Atlantic political and military obligations as one of the most encouraging developments in postwar history. In effect, no postwar United States President, or his Secretary of State, has

<sup>3</sup> See his "Disengagement Revisited," *Foreign Affairs*, January, 1959.



felt disposed to sacrifice the tangible progress, so laboriously achieved, in strengthening the Federal Republic of Germany, in order to engage in diplomatic ventures directed toward some new European order.

Yet, while the United States can acquiesce in the division of Europe and make the best of it (if it has made every reasonable effort to end the deadlock), it cannot afford simply to adhere doggedly to the status quo, to base much of the security and welfare of the Western alliance on the continued partition of Germany and the division of Europe into hostile blocs, or on the untenable premise that this will some day reunite Germany and liquidate the Soviet-United States confrontation in Europe. Since the early 1950's, the United States has insisted on pursuing the mutually exclusive goals of rearming the German Federal Republic and tying it as closely as possible to NATO, while endeavoring, at least ostensibly, to unify the two halves of the country by means of free elections in the context of a reconstituted Europe.

The conflict between the West European alliance policies of the United States and its objective of a European settlement has not been confined to the military and political areas. It has prevailed in the economic sphere as well. There are, for example, the NATO agreements for economic trade restrictions vis-a-vis East Europe. The O.E.-C.D. still has not addressed itself in any meaningful way to the economic development problems of the area, much of which can legitimately be labeled underdeveloped. And the Common Market has not progressed along lines that would easily lead toward the eventual economic reunification of the continent. The United States Congress, moreover, maintains numerous legislative restrictions to prevent increased trade with East Europe while retaining most-favored-nation relationships with those East European states that perhaps least merit them.

The key to the continued division of Europe remains, as it has from the beginning, the German question. How do we lessen Soviet preoccupation with Germany, such obsession presumably having lain at the heart of the division of Europe for over 20 years? Should we seek to support and supplement an ever more powerful German Federal Republic within an omnipresent and militantly anti-Soviet Western alliance and then stand aside and watch the West Germans initiate their own *ostpolitik*, while striving to isolate the East Germans?

It should rather be understood that a contributing reason, if not the primary reason, why the Soviets maintain their current presence in East Europe is that, short of a satisfactory solution in their view to the strategic impasse with the United States, such control is absolutely mandatory in their national interest. In the final analysis, it is reasonable to assume that the Soviets deeply fear that a united West Europe may become the instrument of German ambitions, to be used against the Soviet Union. Is it not this fear that motivates the Soviet Union's East European policy? Is it not true that current American doctrine with regard to this issue serves to reinforce the Soviet belief?

In this sense, one must seriously question whether this nation's present policy of increased intercourse with East Europe can really be fruitful in a context where the major security problems dividing the superstates continue to rankle. We should, instead, inquire whether, and to what extent, other approaches might promote a new and more meaningful European security.

#### THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE

One such alternative is the so-called European Security Conference, first proposed by the Warsaw Pact powers in 1966 and subsequently reemphasized by the East Europeans. It is true that their motives in advocating such a conference have been suspect in Washington of late.<sup>4</sup> Their statements in support of this conference, however, may reflect other purposes.

From the Soviet point of view, by engaging

<sup>4</sup> Secretary Rogers spoke rather clearly to this point in testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs last year. His remarks were reprinted in *The Department of State Bulletin*, July 6, 1970, pp. 1-5, especially p. 3.

in the SALT talks and in bilateral conversations with Bonn, is it not true that the Soviet Union has demonstrated an interest in the idea of a European adjustment that is little short of remarkable, coming hard on the heels of the Czech intervention? The Soviets must surely be aware of the uncertainties en route to détente. The question for them is whether they, no less than the United States, can control the process in order to gain a special unilateral advantage.

As for the East Europeans, they may hope to reduce the danger implicit in the German question. The United States-West German alliance, which for East Europe represents the core of NATO, must surely appear to them more like a potential threat than a stabilizing factor. Then, too, inasmuch as the East European states cannot adequately defend themselves against Soviet military pressure, their only security against new applications of the Brezhnev Doctrine must inevitably involve a mutual effort to effect a gradual change in Moscow's perceptions of Soviet security requirements, perhaps less paranoiac and less coercive than heretofore. The spectacle of East European advocacy and Soviet acceptance of the idea of a European Security Conference illustrates how far the process of détente has progressed in Europe in 1970-1971. For this reason, the European Security Conference idea should not be dismissed willy-nilly by the United States as merely another disruptive Soviet stratagem, to which the East Europeans have been conscious contributors.

In the face of these developments, the current United States policy rationale is depressing: Washington's view being, paradoxically, that the Soviet aim in such a conference is not genuine security but a desire to freeze the *status quo*, and to restrict the bilateral relations of the two Europes.<sup>5</sup> As a result, the United States has indicated a

preference for a carefully modulated, step-by-step approach in the course of which discussions on mutual and balanced force reductions should take place prior to and independent of a larger European conference.<sup>6</sup>

It is evident, however, that new departures are needed. Continued exclusive United States reliance upon its Western security apparatus as a basis for moving toward European détente is an inadequate basis for policy. The Europeans have begun to recognize this dilemma. There now appears to be a growing realization among them that NATO, or similar organizations identified with cold war ideologies and with West European subservience to the United States, are not likely to generate Soviet incentives to reconsider the status of East Europe or of Germany. An initial goal, therefore, on the part of the United States ought to be a restructuring of the Atlantic Alliance to reflect the political, economic and social transformations in Europe. A minimum move of this sort might well lead to the maximum goal of European reconciliation.

There are real dangers. One of these is that the continued adherence of the United States to a conservative balance of power policy in Europe has not prevented a simultaneous de facto disinvolvement of the United States in European affairs over the past several years. What has most probably accounted for this state of affairs has been not an ongoing, realistic assessment of American commitments in Europe, with the aim of exacting meaningful concessions from the other side in response to any new policies, but has rather been part of the larger political backlash emanating from the United States involvement in Southeast Asia.

One result of this development is that Europeans of all sorts have been finding it  
(Continued on page 307)

<sup>5</sup> Pederson's comments on this score are instructive. See *op. cit.*, p. 635.

<sup>6</sup> Kenneth Rush, United States ambassador to the German Federal Republic, recently set forth the Administration's position on this point. His remarks were reprinted in *The Department of State Bulletin*, December 7, 1970, pp. 691-697.

---

Before joining the faculty of Kutztown State College, Roger S. Whitcomb taught at Westminster College. He specializes in United States foreign policy and international systems analysis, and has traveled widely in Europe.

---

"... should Mieczysław Moczar become party leader in Poland with the support of like-minded persons in the Kremlin, the screw will be tightened again and ultimately will lead to even greater violence."

## New Course in Communist-Ruled Poland?

BY RICHARD F. STAAR

*Associate Director of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace,  
Stanford University*

ONE WEEK OF DEMONSTRATIONS by workers, students and housewives in December, 1970, led to the resignation of Władysław Gomułka as well as reconstitution of leading organs within the Polish United Workers' party (P.Z.P.R.—*Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza*). Thus ended more than 14 years of rule by a man who had been hailed in October, 1956, as a great liberal but who launched a course of retrogression<sup>1</sup> the following year. Gomułka's regime had been able to maintain itself despite previous riots—the most recent ones in March, 1968, when thousands of university students clashed with police in major cities throughout the country. Students alone, of course, cannot stop the wheels of industry when they strike.

The immediate cause for the demonstrations in December, 1970, appears to have been a radio announcement, later appearing on the front page of the P.Z.P.R. daily newspaper. The article listed price changes for

various commodities and gave comparative average monthly wages for 1965 as well as for the first 11 months of the current year.<sup>2</sup> A simple computation indicated that costs in time worked, for example, would amount to four hours per kilogram of frozen beef (3.3 previously); five hours for pork (4.0); some 2.2 for fish (1.1); and 8.4 for ham (6.4).

Several hundred dock workers and students demonstrated against the price increases on December 14 in the streets of Gdańsk. Special units of uniformed police and the fire department dispersed them. The following day, housewives and workers from other enterprises in that port city joined the crowds. The riots extended to neighboring Gdynia and Sopot. In Gdańsk, Gdynia and Elbląg alone, according to the local newspapers, 27 persons were killed and 319 were injured. At Szczecin, the toll was 14 dead and 117 wounded.<sup>3</sup> Workers struck and/or demonstrated in Warsaw, Wrocław, and other major cities in support of a 20 per cent wage increase.

The government invoked martial law on December 17 and ordered the police and security forces to restore order by any means required including the use of firearms. That same day, the main P.Z.P.R. daily published a four-page report on the economy which had been submitted by the Political Bureau to the sixth plenum of the Central Committee. It surveyed key problems facing

<sup>1</sup> Compare "Hard Line in Poland," *Current History*, April, 1967, pp. 208–213, 244; and "Poland: Myth versus Reality," *ibid.*, April, 1969, pp. 218–223.

<sup>2</sup> "Purchasing Power of Average Wages in the Socialized Economy," *Trybuna ludu* (People's Tribune), Warsaw, December 16, 1970.

<sup>3</sup> *Głos wybrzeża* (Voice of the Coast), Gdańsk, December 31, 1970–January 1, 1971; *Kurier Szczeciński* (Szczecin Courier), December 29, 1970. Official figures gave a total of 45 dead and 1,165 injured for all disturbances. *Trybuna ludu*, February 8, 1971.

Poland just prior to the anticipated inauguration of the new five-year plan on January 1, 1971.<sup>4</sup> The picture could not be construed as optimistic.

### ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

After presenting impressive statistics on the per capita growth of national income, industrial production and capital investment, the report admitted a low level of labor productivity. The latter allegedly stemmed from poor discipline and lack of modern equipment. Other difficulties were revealed in agriculture, where the grain harvest totaled only 16.3 million tons during 1970, representing a decline of 2.3 million tons compared with the preceding year. The failure of potato and green fodder crops had adversely affected livestock as well as the income of rural inhabitants. Furthermore, net exports of bulk meat and fats had decreased by 47 million and agricultural foodstuffs by 154 million foreign exchange zlotys during 1970, a situation aggravated by the necessity to import large quantities of fodder.

These problems led to the decision to raise food prices which went into effect on December 13, 1970. A freeze on wages, dismissal of at least 30,000 workers, and a delay in the payment of bonuses had been planned. Simultaneously, in the hope of increasing labor productivity, a new material incentives system was announced, to become operative on New Year's Day. Proposals to change wage scales, in this connection, resulted in apprehension on the part of shipyard workers that their earnings would decline. Government exhortations concerning production costs, quality, international competition and balance of payment problems apparently were not accepted by those employed in Poland's industries. As a consequence of the riots, a total of 19 public

buildings (including the P.Z.P.R. headquarters in Gdańsk and Szczecin) were set on fire and gutted, some 220 stores were looted and burned, and considerable transportation and city equipment was destroyed.<sup>5</sup> Extensive other damage occurred.

The new party leader, Edward Gierek, described the events of December, 1970, as involving a "crisis of confidence" in the government. He cited the neglect in consumer goods production which had prevented any growth in real wages. Regarding agriculture, "mistaken economic decisions" had sacrificed any increase in the number of pigs raised because of the goal of self-sufficiency in grain and fodder. The housing situation, rather than improving, had deteriorated. Expenditures for health services had been "drastically reduced" over the years. The explanation for this chaotic condition appears in the statement that, although national income increased by only 34 per cent,<sup>6</sup> investments grew some 50 per cent during the 1966-1970 five-year period.

Other criticism was directed by Gierek against the Planning Commission, which had "lost sight of long-term development strategy" and had often replaced government agencies at the operational level. Economic policy, thus, had been determined on an *ad hoc* basis. A faulty style and incorrect methods of management had affected the mood of society, and particularly that of the younger generation. The absence of links even with its own activists had forced the P.Z.P.R. leadership to impose "administrative methods," a euphemism for police repression, which limited independence and initiative.

### A POLITICAL CONSPIRACY?

A conspiracy against Gomułka is alleged to have developed in the fall of 1970 under the direction of Gierek and Mieczysław Moczar, who supervised the armed forces and security. Other full or candidate Politburo members included Deputy Premier Jaroszewicz, Rzeszów province secretary Kruczek, chief ideologist Szydlak, and agriculture boss Tejchma. They reportedly found various

<sup>4</sup> *Trybuna ludu*, December 17, 1970, pp. 3-6.

<sup>5</sup> Edward Gierek, "Program for Development of Socialist Poland," *Trybuna ludu*, February 8, 1971, p. 3; speech to the 8th plenum of the P.Z.P.R. Central Committee. It is interesting to compare Gomułka's speech to another 8th plenum, which has many parallels with the above. See *Nowe drogi* (New Paths), X, No. 10 (October, 1956), pp. 21-46, noting especially the promises Gomułka made at that time.

<sup>6</sup> Gierek, *op. cit.*



reasons for not attending the December 9 and 13 Politburo meetings as well as the December 14 Central Committee plenum.<sup>7</sup>

Gierek reportedly arrived two or three days later from Silesia with an armed escort, established himself 12 kilometers from Warsaw in a secret police villa at Legionowo, and began organizing a rival Politburo. Gomulka allegedly learned of the plot and telephoned Soviet party leader Leonid Brezhnev at the Kremlin, but no help arrived. An effort to enlist support from the Polish armed forces remained unsuccessful because Defense Minister Jaruzelski and the generals supported Gierek.

Although the palace *coup* had been consummated on December 18, it was not until the following day that the rump Politburo met officially to approve a new leadership (Kliszko, Spychalski, Strzelecki, Jaszczuk, and Kociolek—all reportedly under house arrest). This combination of domestic and possibly external<sup>8</sup> pressure resulted, thus, in the ouster of seven out of twelve Politburo members within about a six-week period. The first to be expelled by the 7th Central Committee plenum on December 20 included Gomulka, Bolesław Jaszczuk (supervising the economy), Zenon Kliszko (deputy leader), Marian Spychalski (chief of state), and Ryszard Strzelecki (in charge of security). Two others were dismissed on February 7, 1971, by the 8th plenum: Stanisław Kociolek

(at one time, secretary for Gdańsk province) and trade union chairman Ignacy Loga-Sowiński, both of whom were permitted to resign.<sup>9</sup> The new leadership group, with its areas of responsibility, is shown in Table I, on page 273.

It is interesting to note the background of Edward Gierek, the new party leader. Born on January 6, 1913, at Porąbka near Będzin, Silesia, Gierek was taken to France ten years later, after his father's death in a coal-mine accident. An official biography indicates that young Gierek began to work as a miner at the age of 13 and at 18 joined the French Communist party in the Pas de Calais area. Deported to Poland in 1934 because of strike activities, he served in the Polish armed forces as a draftee.<sup>10</sup> He emigrated again in 1937, this time to Belgium.

Gierek transferred his membership to the Belgian Communist party and reportedly belonged to the anti-German resistance during the Second World War. He also participated in a Communist front organization called the Union of Polish Patriots and served as chairman for the National Council of Poles in Belgium after World War II.<sup>11</sup> Gierek did not return to Poland until 1948, having lived abroad for approximately 22 years.

In Poland, he has served as instructor for the central party apparatus in Warsaw, deputy organizational director on the Katowice province P.Z.P.R. staff (1949), economic secretary there (1951), director for heavy industry at the party center (1954), and as P.Z.P.R. secretary at the national level two years later. From 1957 on, he served as first secretary for Katowice province and also on the Political Bureau.

Gierek is eight years younger than Gomulka and should be able to identify with workers more successfully. Although he did not immediately rescind the increases that had affected food prices, some 8.6 billion zlotys (almost \$300 million) in additional pay were allocated to over five million persons in the lowest income and pension brackets. Cancellation of the rise in food prices did not take place until March 1, 1971. A "consumers' charter" had promised earlier that

<sup>7</sup> *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (Zurich), January 21, 1971.

<sup>8</sup> Bernard Margueritte, in his "Leadership of the Polish Communist Party Focuses on Renovation Program," *Le Monde* (Paris), January 31-February 1, 1971, p. 5, refers to a December 17 communication from Moscow, reportedly expressing considerable uneasiness about the situation in Poland.

<sup>9</sup> In the case of Kociolek, his letter of self-criticism was read to the Central Committee. He may return one day to the Politburo, since he is only 37 years old. His biographical sketch appeared in *Trybuna ludu*, December 22, 1970, when he was elevated to full membership on the Political Bureau.

<sup>10</sup> Not mentioned by Radio Warsaw, December 20, 1970. See my book, *Poland, 1944-1962* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1962), pp. 183-184; and Friedrich H. Neumann, "A Patriot of Socialist Poland?" *Christ und Welt* (Stuttgart), January 1, 1971.

<sup>11</sup> "25th Anniversary of Polish Communist Party Units in France and Belgium," *Trybuna ludu*, January 25, 1971.

TABLE I: THE POWER ELITE IN POLAND, 1971

Politburo and Secretariat	Date of birth	Government office	Joined Party	Party office (other than Politburo)
POLITBURO MEMBERS (10)				
<i>Babiuch, Edward</i>	1927	—	1948	Secretary (cadres and organizational affairs)
Cyrankiewicz, Józef	1911	Chairman, Council of State	1948	—
Gierek, Edward	1913	—	1931	First Secretary (leader)
Jaroszewicz, Piotr*	1909	Premier	1944	—
Jędrychowski, Stefan	1910	Foreign Minister	1932	—
Kruczek, Władysław	1910	Chairman, Trade Union Council	1932	—
Moczar, Mieczysław*	1913	Member, Council of State	1937	Secretary (army; security, administration)
Olszowski, Stefan*	1931	—	1952	Secretary (press, culture, and youth)
Szydlak, Jan*	1925	—	1945	Secretary (propaganda and ideology)
Tejchma, Józef	1927	Chairman, P.Z.P.R. Sejm deputies' group	1952	Secretary (parliament, science, foreign policy)
POLITBURO CANDIDATES (4)				
<i>Jabłoński, Henryk</i>	1909	Education Minister	1948	—
Jagielski, Mieczysław	1924	Deputy Premier (C.M.E.A.†)	1945	—
<i>Jaruzelski, Wojciech</i>	1923	Defense Minister	1947	—
<i>Kępa, Józef</i>	1928	—	1948	First Secretary, Warsaw City
SECRETARIES (8, with 6 above)				
<i>Barcikowski, Kazimierz</i>	1927	—	ca. 1948	Secretary (agriculture)
Starewicz, Artur	1917	Chairman, Polish Group, Interparliamentary Union	1932	Secretary (secretarial matters for Politburo)

SOURCES: *Trybuna ludu*, December 22, 1970, and February 8, 1971, for biographical data; Jerzy Solecki, head of Interpress, to foreign reporters as cited by *The New York Times*, February 9, 1971, for responsibilities in the last column.

NOTES: \* Promoted from Secretariat or candidate Politburo status.  
Italics indicate newcomers.

† C.M.E.A.—Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.

there would be no price increases on non-seasonal goods for at least two years. It was announced also that of the 2.5 million tons of grain to be imported during 1971, two

million would come from the U.S.S.R., and that 600,000 tons had already arrived.<sup>12</sup> Farmers have been promised an additional 150,000 tons of fodder concentrates and 250,000 tons of coal above plan, admittedly to stimulate animal breeding.

In sketching his program, the new P.Z.P.R.

<sup>12</sup> *Trybuna ludu*, January 11, 1971; Radio Warsaw, February 8, 1971.

leader indicated that the decade of the 1970's would decisively affect Poland's development. Modernization of the economy will require a scientific-technological revolution, a change in the structure of exports, and comprehensive investments for selected branches of industry. Not giving up "socialist transformation" in rural areas, Gierek promised support to agricultural circles<sup>13</sup> and to state as well as collective farms. He mentioned that about one million hectares had been taken by the government from elderly farmers who could no longer cultivate their land, and he promised to introduce comprehensive social insurance for the countryside.

Despite better roads, increased motorization and an improved telecommunications system, urban and rural planning is to preserve man's natural environment. The Polish Academy of Sciences has engaged in a project called "Poland in the Year 2000" which should produce ideas and the initiative for the conservation program. This will require modernization of both management and administration. A team of experts in economics, finance, sociology and information sciences is working to develop such a strategy for socio-economic development over the next 10 to 15 years. One of the goals is a five-day working week.

Gierek also attempted to inspire the younger generation with a call for "new ho-

rizons" that would satisfy the material, cultural, ideological and intellectual aspirations of youth. The 1971-1975 economic plan envisages a requirement for 1.9 million new jobs, compared with only 1.5 million during the preceding five-year period.<sup>14</sup> An attempt will be made to attract youth with co-participation in and co-responsibility for development of the country. Future changes in the educational system will have as their objective universal secondary schooling before the end of the 1970's, with teachers as "ardent social workers" shaping both character and attitudes.

Turning to domestic politics, Gierek categorically rejected the "bourgeois-liberal system of free play for political forces." He did, however, suggest a new look at various organizations and institutions. Workers' self-government will be supported, and trade unions will be expected to improve their methods of activity. The practice of talking with representatives of the working class, initiated by Gierek during December-January (1970-1971) in both Gdańsk and Szczecin,<sup>15</sup> is to be continued. The powers of the *Sejm* (Parliament) are to be strengthened by an increased use of interpolation (questioning of ministers) as well as by more parliamentary control over government.

Press, radio and television were asked by Gierek to expose "squandering, loafing, lack of social discipline," and other negative phenomena. Work allegedly will not be assigned according to party and organizational affiliation or "whether a person is a believer or a non-believer."<sup>16</sup> Joint action by the P.Z.P.R., the United Peasant party, and the Democratic party were suggested in agriculture, services and the crafts. The worker-peasant alliance, however, will remain the class foundation of the state. The ruling P.Z.P.R. promises close cooperation with all organizations and individual members of the National Unity Front.

In foreign affairs, the alliance with the Soviet Union "is of fundamental importance for Poland's independence, security, and development." The treaty signed with West Germany on December 7, 1970, concerning

<sup>13</sup> Gierek, *op. cit.*, p. 4. In effect, he will continue Gomułka's policy of attempting gradually to eliminate private entrepreneur farms by conditioning the proprietors to engage in cooperative enterprises through the agricultural circles. See my *Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), 2nd rev. ed., pp. 146-147.

<sup>14</sup> Gierek, *op. cit.* By 1975, some three-fourths of the gainfully employed population will be under 30 years of age. *Żołnierz wolności* (Soldier of Freedom), Warsaw, February 11, 1971.

<sup>15</sup> A second wave of strikes occurred in January-February, 1971, the latter among 10,000 women workers in seven textile plants at Łódź which lasted five days. Premier Jaroszewicz appeared in person to mollify the strikers. In a subsequent address over television, he stated that wages could not be raised. *Trybuna ludu*, February 15, 1971.

<sup>16</sup> Radio Warsaw, February 11, 1971, called for cooperation by the Roman Catholic Church in socialist construction. In return, the government has decided to transfer former German church properties in the western and northern territories to the Polish Episcopate.

the renunciation of force and recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line<sup>17</sup> came allegedly "thanks to the Moscow [-Bonn] treaty of August 12 which began the process of normalizing relations . . .," i.e., as a result of the U.S.S.R. example. Among the non-bloc states, Gierek mentioned only France and the November, 1970, declaration of friendship and cooperation with that country.

He promised that the P.Z.P.R. would continue to bear the main responsibility for both external and domestic affairs, because it "must fulfill its functions as the leading force in compliance with Marxist-Leninist ideology. . . . Only the Party, guided by Marxist-Leninist ideology, is able to make decisions of key importance." Gierek openly stated the following:<sup>18</sup>

Therefore, the Party, as the leading force, should map out social, economic, and political goals. It should conduct ceaseless, profound ideological work based on the Marxist-Leninist ideology and political work among the masses. It should direct a broadly conceived cadres policy. It should exercise political control over implementation of targets and carry out their verification in practice. It should analyze social problems.

After expressing two "truths," namely that (1) the historic leading force is and remains the P.Z.P.R. and that (2) Poland can develop only allied indivisibly with the Soviet Union, Gierek ended on a patriotic note and predicted that "the future of Poland lies in socialism."

### TRENDS AND PROSPECTS

As suggested in the foregoing, many parallels exist between the events of 1956-1957

<sup>17</sup> Text broadcast over Radio Warsaw, November 20, 1970; published in *The New York Times* the following day, after it had been initialed by the respective foreign ministers.

<sup>18</sup> Gierek, *op. cit.*, p. 5. See also his article on "Guarding Socialism and Peace" in *Żołnierz wolności*, August 15-16, 1970, p. 3, where he voiced similar ideas.

<sup>19</sup> V. Mikhailov, "Incubators of Lies," *Pravda* (Moscow), January 30, 1970, p. 5, denounced the U.P.I. for disseminating the allegation that the Soviet Union is ready to invade Poland (as it did Czechoslovakia in August, 1968).

<sup>20</sup> *Trybuna ludu*, February 8, 1971.

<sup>21</sup> The decision to rescind these price increases was made possible allegedly because of Soviet assistance in the form of unspecified credits. *Ibid.*, February 16, 1971.

and of 1970-1971 in Poland. For decision-makers in the Kremlin, loyal membership in the East European alliance system and control over domestic affairs would appear to represent the *sine qua non* for preventing the application of the Brezhnev Doctrine.<sup>19</sup> Gierek may not have been the first choice of the Soviet Union but, like Gomulka before him, he probably was recognized as the only leader with some charisma who could restore law and order.

### GOMULKA'S FAILURE

Gomulka had shown his loyalty to the Warsaw Treaty Organization by having Polish troops take part in the 1968 Soviet-led occupation of neighboring Czechoslovakia. However, he failed in the second requirement when the Polish riots escalated along the Baltic coast and spread to other parts of the country. Indeed, the communiqué<sup>20</sup> suspending Gomulka from Central Committee membership criticizes the "inappropriate methods applied during the crisis. . . ." A special commission, headed by Jan Szydlak and announced at the 8th plenum, is investigating the part played by the former P.Z.P.R. leadership in the December, 1970, events.

Although the immediate cause involved the steep increase in food prices less than two weeks before Christmas,<sup>21</sup> the economy in general has been stagnating for the past several years. Reforms were cautious and failed to remedy the situation. Even though the regime had concentrated on food exports to obtain foreign exchange, agriculture (some 85 per cent in private hands) was never given the assistance necessary to feed the indigenous population and send increasing quantities of food abroad to obtain foreign exchange.

It would be a mistake to anticipate any dramatic improvement in Poland's economic situation. Progress can only be achieved slowly, with the constant threat of further mass demonstrations. The picture of Polish dockyard workers being killed by security forces will continue to haunt the Communist leaders in Warsaw. If they do not understand the lesson to be learned from these experiences, they will be condemned to relive



an even more explosive chain of events in the future.

The lesson is primarily political and not economic. A population that is alienated from the regime and excluded from consultation will choose the only means available to express its opposition. Political demands for removal of key officials have been met, even though belatedly.<sup>22</sup> Whether the new leadership is capable of establishing a working compromise between popular demands for a greater voice in decision-making and the traditional monopoly position of the ruling Communist party remains to be seen.

The alternative appears to be a tougher group, perhaps under the leadership of Mieczysław Moczar, promoted in December, 1970, to full membership on the Political Bureau. He is in charge of the armed forces and security in his other capacity as a secretary of the Central Committee. One of his protégés, Franciszek Szlachcic, is now in charge of the interior ministry, which controls the police. Another member of Moczar's group, General Józef Urbanowicz, who heads the Main Political Administration of the armed forces, was promoted to full membership on the Central Committee.<sup>23</sup>

It is interesting to note the emergence of this neo-partisan faction in key positions throughout the country. Józef Kępa, the first P.Z.P.R. secretary for Warsaw city, allegedly belongs to the group. His speech at a party conference in mid-January, of which only a few insignificant excerpts were published, reportedly included hard-line overtones. An individual attending the meeting in the central city district indicated that Kępa had explained the December riots as having

occurred because those in power did not put into effect the "March policy,"<sup>24</sup> i.e., a program outlined by the partisans after the 1968 student demonstrations.

### A TOUGH POLICY

Some indication of what this tough policy would be like can be seen from a document attributed to shipyard workers at Gdynia and published originally in *The Times* of London. It accused Moczar of genocide in the mass killing of 210 people "by the Polish N.K.V.D." or secret police. The massacre allegedly occurred when machine-gun fire was directed against a crowd of some 2,000 demonstrators.<sup>25</sup>

It is not inconceivable that Moczar and his partisan group played an important part in the December, 1970, decision to raise food prices, probably anticipating the consequences. One can further speculate that Moczar had no intention of trying to succeed Gomułka at that time, realizing full well the difficulties ahead. Playing out the scenario of a typical East European police provocation on a national scale, it is possible that Moczar will follow Gierek into the Number One position. This depends, of course, on developments in the U.S.S.R. However, should Mieczysław Moczar become party leader in Poland with the support of like-minded persons in the Kremlin, the screw will be tightened again and ultimately will lead to even greater violence. The 24th Congress of the C.P.S.U., which opened in Moscow on March 30, 1971, and its aftermath will provide the key to future developments.

<sup>22</sup> For example, Interior Minister Kazimierz Świątała was not replaced until a month after the first riots. Radio Warsaw, January 23, 1971. His security forces had fired on the demonstrators.

<sup>23</sup> Radio Moscow, February 8, 1971. Appointment of former Stalinists to high government positions, e.g., Bolesław Rumiński as State Council deputy chairman, Andrzej Werblan as deputy *Sejm* speaker, Wincenty Kraśko as Deputy Premier, and Kazimierz Olszewski as foreign trade minister, would appear to support the above trend.

<sup>24</sup> Bernard Margueritte, "Agitation Continues in Poland," *Le Monde*, January 20, 1971, pp. 1 and 4.

<sup>25</sup> Reprinted in *The New York Times*, January 28, 1971.

---

Richard F. Staar is author of *Poland, 1944-1962* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1962) and of *Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), 2nd rev. ed., published in paperback. He has edited *Aspects of Modern Communism* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1968), as well as the last three volumes of the *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1969-1971).

---

*"... the three closely linked internal problems of regional rivalry, political secession and unbalanced economic development are creating a growing concern about Yugoslavia's future. . . ."*

## Yugoslavia's Future

BY STEPHEN S. ANDERSON

*Associate Professor of Government, Windham College*

AT THIS PARTICULAR POINT in Yugoslavia's development it seems appropriate to focus attention upon her internal affairs. This is not because foreign relations are currently stagnant or uninteresting—indeed some rather significant initiatives and successes have occurred in the past year or so—but rather because domestic affairs appear to be moving toward a severe test of the edifice of Yugoslav nationalism so painstakingly constructed during the postwar era. More specifically, the three closely linked internal problems of regional rivalry, political succession and unbalanced economic development are creating a growing concern about Yugoslavia's future among both Yugoslavs and students of Yugoslav affairs.

### ETHNIC BACKGROUND

Although composed of elements of several long-established cultures and politics, Yugoslavia is a relatively young nation. It was formed in 1919, in the aftermath of World War I and the collapse of the Turkish and Austro-Hungarian Empires. Its formation was due largely to the efforts of the Serbs, a numerous and dynamic Balkan people who had enjoyed national independence since the early nineteenth century. The other major group in that original Yugoslav state was the Croat nation, which had existed for many centuries to the northeast of the Serbs within the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Catholicism and Western (if not Germanic) orientation of the Croats distinguished them

sharply from the Orthodox and Russian-oriented Serbs, even though both spoke much the same language. In addition to Serbs and Croats, Yugoslavia also embraced several smaller Balkan Slavic groups: the Slovenes of the northern alpine regions; the Macedonians of the extreme south, closely related, historically and culturally, to the Bulgarians; the Montenegrins, a mountainous offshoot of the Serbian nation; and the inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina, who comprised an uneasy mixture of Serbian, Croatian and Turkish elements, the last a consequence of centuries-long inclusion in the Turkish empire, an experience shared by the Serbs and Macedonians. Besides these Slavic groups there were the Shiptars, closely related to the Albanians and inhabiting a region, now known as Kosmet, bordering Albania, as well as a *mélange* of Hungarian, Rumanian and Germanic groups spread across the Voivodina, a plains region to the northwest.

These ethnic patterns have persisted, and it is impossible to comprehend contemporary Yugoslavia without an awareness of their existence. The frictions they produced were a major cause of Yugoslav impotence during the interwar period. They deeply influenced the character of the anti-Nazi partisan movement which Josip Tito created during World War II. They present perhaps the most fundamental challenge to the development of a stable Yugoslav nation-state today.

In considering the problem of regional rivalry in Yugoslavia, it is well to distinguish

between two rather different sources of tension, one specifically ethnic and the other essentially political. Ethnic tensions arise from long-standing prejudices ("Montenegrins are lazy," "Serbs are arrogant," "Slovenes are chiselers") and misunderstandings among the various ethnic groups. In most, although by no means all, cases these are directed against the Serbs by the other nationalities, and vice versa. Political tensions have to do with the issue of power: should power be centralized in the federal government or in the republican and other constituent governments? This issue is, of course, enormously complicated by the fact that the seat of federal power, Belgrade, is also the capital of Serbia, and has traditionally been staffed largely by Serbs even when upper-echelon positions have been distributed among the various ethnic groups.

In the early postwar years, the newly-installed Communist regime's approach to this problem of regional rivalry was a centralist one: political and economic control was concentrated heavily in Belgrade, and the party itself was organized in a way that permitted little autonomy to its republican (i.e. ethnic) subdivisions. Following the 1948 break with Moscow, for reasons of both political and economic expediency, this centralized power structure was gradually modified to the point where today it is clear that both the party and governmental organizations at the republican level are beginning to rival the authority of the central government in Belgrade.

For example, in the summer of 1969, a bitter controversy broke out between Slovenia and the federal government over the allocation of highway construction funds. At one point, the Slovene Premier and most of his Cabinet threatened to resign if Slovene demands were not met, and the personal intervention of President Tito was required even to reach a highly unsatisfactory compromise. In Kosmet, matters took a still more ominous turn during 1968–1969 with the surfacing of

widespread anti-Serb demonstrations and agitation for Republic status for Kosmet, instead of its present position as an autonomous region *within* Serbia. This demand was flatly denied and some 30 Shiptars were tried and sentenced for "fomenting national hatred." At the same time, however, the federal government took significant steps to improve economic conditions in Kosmet (its per capita income of \$250 is the lowest in Yugoslavia) and to place more Shiptars in positions of authority within the region.<sup>1</sup>

It is in Croatia, however, that ethnic and political tensions most strongly reinforce each other and where the most troubling situation is developing. The Croats have always chafed at what they consider to be exploitation by the poorer and more backward regions of Yugoslavia—i.e., Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is only since the mid-1960's, however, that the political system has been sufficiently liberalized to allow relatively free expression of these sentiments, not only in public forums but within the party organization itself. The gist of the complaint is that Croatia, together with Slovenia (which is also quite advanced economically), is being held back in economic development by grandiose development plans for the southern parts of the country, financed by federal taxes which drain off capital from the north. The two northern republics, with only a little over a quarter of the population, account for almost seventy per cent of Yugoslavia's industrial production and a like proportion of its foreign trade earnings.

At the end of 1969 a Plenary Session of the Croatian League of Communists sharply condemned the view expressed by certain Belgrade "hardliners" that "Croatism" (regional nationalism) had developed to the point where some sort of central discipline was needed. The Plenum asserted Croatia's right to manage her internal affairs as she saw fit.<sup>2</sup> During 1970, demands were voiced by highly placed Croatian leaders for further decentralization of the banking system in order to give each republic full control of all capital resources created within its bounds.

<sup>1</sup> M. Djekic, "Troubles of Kossovo," *Yugoslav Life*, XVI, 1 (January, 1971), p. 3, and *The Economist* (London), May 2, 1970, p. 44.

<sup>2</sup> *The New York Times*, February 5, 1970, p. 2.

This political self-assertiveness in Croatia has been paralleled by ethnic self-assertion, centered particularly on the delicate matter of language. Serbian and Croatian are very similar, differing mainly in alphabet (Roman for Croatian, Cyrillic for Serbian), the pronunciation of certain vowels, and vocabulary. During the postwar era the official view has been that they are dialects of the same language designated, rather awkwardly, "Serbo-Croatian." In 1954, the task of producing a definitive dictionary of the Serbo-Croatian language was undertaken jointly by the official Croatian and Serbian cultural organizations.

The project never generated great enthusiasm, and as regional rivalry began to intensify in the 1960's, it clearly began to waver. In 1967, furor was touched off when a group of Croatian intellectuals demanded that Croatian be recognized as a separate language, equal to Serbian in legal and cultural status. Serb intellectuals responded by demanding that all Serbs living in Croatia (about 160,000 persons) should be entitled to learn and write their language in the Cyrillic alphabet. At that time, the party stepped in, with Tito publicly rebuking both sides, but the tension continued to grow until finally, in early 1971, the Croatian organization announced that it was terminating the joint dictionary project, because of Serbian uncooperativeness.<sup>3</sup>

### THE PROBLEM OF SUCCESSION

Taken by itself, this linguistic controversy might seem trivial, even ludicrous, but as an important element in a larger pattern of growing Croat-Serbian animosity it is indeed disquieting. That pattern is undoubtedly one of the reasons that President Tito has openly tried, over the past two years, to create machinery for political succession capable of weathering the situation his departure will create. For there is no doubt that the aging leader (he will be 79 this year) is one of the most important factors of cohesion in Yugoslavia today. His personal intervention in

the Slovene and Croatian episodes has already been mentioned, and there have been many similar situations over the years. Born a Croat, his career has transcended regional rivalries, and he holds the respect of at least sizable segments of the general public and the leadership strata in all parts of Yugoslavia.

His effort to prepare for the inevitable—his own departure from the scene—has proceeded on two levels: party and governmental. At each level it has taken the form of arrangements designed to insure (so far as such things can be assured) a regionally-balanced, post-Tito collective leadership.

The Yugoslav League of Communists (the official name of the ruling Communist party) held its ninth congress in March, 1969. At this congress, Tito proposed several structural changes, which were subsequently adopted. The existing eleven-man Executive Committee was replaced by a fifteen-man Executive Bureau, composed by statute of two top party leaders from each of the six republics, one from each of the two autonomous regions, and Tito. His position in the Bureau was designated as unique and will cease to exist after his retirement or death. Other changes included the expansion of the next-lower body from 35 to 52 members, with representation on a demographic basis, and elimination of the 154-member Central Committee entirely, in favor of an Annual League Conference of approximately 200 party notables.

All this may seem a mere numbers and semantics game, but there is a clear intent: to create an ethnically-balanced, collective party executive, checked by a demographically-apportioned referent body. About a year and a half later, September, 1970, President Tito turned his attention to reforming Yugoslavia's governmental structure at the federal level. Actually, there had been many earlier governmental reorganizations, the most recent example of which was the creation, in 1968, of a Federal Executive Council. This 17-man body corresponded to the Cabinet of Western parliamentary systems and was headed by a Premier, initially Mika

<sup>3</sup> *The New York Times*, January 29, 1971, p. 8.



Spiljak, a Croat, and subsequently Mitja Ribicic, a Slovene. In addition to this Council, in 1968, there was also created a Presidency (but no Vice Presidency) which was filled by Tito himself. While the exact role and powers of the Presidency were not precisely clarified, it seemed to serve primarily as a position from which Tito could survey the operations of the federal government and intervene in politics when necessary, as in the 1968 Belgrade University student strike.

Tito's September, 1970, proposal was to make this Presidency into a collective body composed of two or three representatives from each republic from "the main social-political groups, including, of course, the Communist party."<sup>4</sup> Inasmuch as Tito, in the same speech, criticized the work of the Federal Executive Council, it seemed likely that his intention was to reduce the political role of the Council and make the new collective Presidency the real locus of power at the federal level, together with the Federal Assembly (Parliament). As public discussion of his proposal developed during the fall and winter, this supposition received further confirmation. Draft constitutional amendments published in February, 1971, described a fourteen-man Presidential Council consisting, like the party's Executive Bureau, of two representatives from each republic and one from each autonomous region, all elected for five-year terms. This body would choose a President and Vice President, but for a one-year term only, with the two offices apparently being rotated among new republics each year. This Presidential Council would have the power to propose legislation to the Federal Assembly, but if the two bodies could not reconcile any differences within nine months, both must be dissolved. The Federal Executive Council, conversely, would become a strictly administrative organ, charged only with carrying out policy. Tito would continue as President of the Republic and in that capacity would join and head the new Presi-

dential Council, but upon his retirement that office would cease to exist.<sup>5</sup>

These top-level reorganizations, which are still only in the discussion stage, will probably not be promulgated until the summer of 1971; they represent only one side of the effort to deal with impending post-Tito regional problems. Included in the same package of proposed constitutional amendments are several whose purpose is clearly to carry the process of political and economic decentralization still further and thereby to placate anti-centralist (and anti-Serb?) sentiments in the republics. These amendments would leave the federal government with full power only over foreign affairs, defense, and certain aspects of the economy, such as the currency system and the regulation of the unitary market. The only investment capital remaining in federal hands, for example, would be a special fund for the use of underdeveloped areas, on a revolving credit basis, to be raised by income taxes levied on all Yugoslavs. Most federal laws and regulations, particularly in the field of economics, would require the assent of the republics before they could take effect.

Tito's strategy for dealing with the problem of succession may now be summarized as follows: improved consensus-building organs at the federal level (Presidential Council and Party Executive Bureau) in combination with increased autonomy at the republic level. While on first glance this may seem to be a bold strategy, it is very likely the only one available at the moment, for no one, not even Tito, has the stature or authority to deal with the problem by the alternative path of political recentralization.

Will it work? No one can say for sure at this point. Edward Kardelj, Tito's closest political associate, has said that:

the collective presidency will not be a magic wand to solve all the controversies and problems that time brings, but it should certainly speed up the discussion and settlement of such disputes. . . . Should the presidency be incapable of such initiatives, it would certainly mean that it was not performing its duty. This would mean not only that this organ is in crisis, but that the whole society is in crisis. But our society is not in

<sup>4</sup> *The New York Times*, September 22, 1970, p. 7.

<sup>5</sup> *The New York Times*, February 28, 1971; and conversation with Maldin Soic, Director, Yugoslav Information Center, New York.

crisis and we have no reason to doubt that the presidency will perform its positive role in overcoming social problems and conflicts.<sup>6</sup>

Not so sure was Milovan Djilas, a former member of the party inner circle long in disfavor for his outspokenly critical views. Writing last October in *The New York Times* he asserted that:

the economic and ideological crisis has transformed itself into a governmental crisis. Because of this the proposed reorganization of the apex of the government—a “collective” presidency instead of a president, will aggravate rather than lessen the inefficiency of the administration and the bickering of the already disassociated chiefs.<sup>7</sup>

### ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Djilas' remark brings up the third critical problem mentioned at the beginning of this article, but so far alluded to only in passing: the problem of unbalanced economic development. This problem has many facets, including of course the serious disparity between the more and less developed regions, but in recent years the salient fact has been that both producer and consumer demand has grown throughout most of the country much faster than the economy's ability to satisfy it. One consequence of this was a strong inflationary trend which shot the cost of living up by 11 per cent in each of the past two years.<sup>8</sup> Another was the huge and growing foreign trade deficit (excess of imports over exports) which reached the staggering figure of \$1.2 billion in 1970. Foreign currency receipts from tourists and from Yugoslavs working abroad reduced this to a balance-of-payments deficit of “only” \$370 million, but the fact remained that even such a deficit indicated a serious shortcoming.

Under a more dogmatic and authoritarian

regime, central controls over wages, prices, investments, exports and imports would have been imposed long ago, in the face of such trends. Yugoslav central planners hesitated, and in fact they lacked the authority to tamper in such a way with the market-centered economy established by the 1965 reforms. Instead, they attempted to apply a number of indirect solutions to the problem, such as negotiations for special trade agreements with the European Common Market (successfully concluded in early 1970); encouragement of foreign investment in Yugoslavia through partnerships with Yugoslav firms (enacted in 1967 but disappointing in results);<sup>9</sup> toleration of high levels of migration of both unemployed and skilled workers (over 850,000 were abroad during 1970, mostly in West Europe, contributing some \$450 million in remittances to Yugoslavia);<sup>10</sup> and expanded tourism (foreign tourists brought in \$350 million during 1970).<sup>11</sup>

Toward the end of 1970, however, it was clear that more drastic steps would be required at the federal level. With the approval of the Federal Assembly, an import surtax was established, followed in October by a temporary price freeze and additional import restrictions. December saw the setting of an 11 per cent ceiling on wage increases to last until April 30, 1971, at which time the federal government expected to institute, in cooperation with the republics, a “comprehensive stabilization program” of an as yet unspecified nature. Then, in mid-January, 1971, the dinar was devaluated by one-quarter of its value (from 12.50 dinars/dollar to 15.00), a move designed simultaneously to improve the position of Yugoslav tourism and exports, and to discourage the import of foreign goods.<sup>12</sup>

These are short-term solutions, however, capable only of providing a breathing spell in which to deal with the underlying problem. It is by no means clear at this writing how the Yugoslavs intend to do this, but one thing is reasonably certain; the solution will not involve a recentralization of economic power in Belgrade. The proposed constitutional reforms mentioned earlier have as their

<sup>6</sup> *The New York Times*, October 5, 1970, p. 11.

<sup>7</sup> *The New York Times*, October 30, 1970, p. 41.

<sup>8</sup> *The New York Times*, January 23, 1971, p. 6.

<sup>9</sup> Anthony Silvester, “Yugoslavia's Consumers Call the Shots,” *East Europe*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (January, 1971), pp. 23–27, see especially pp. 25–26.

<sup>10</sup> *Yugoslav News Bulletin*, No. 468, January 27, 1971, p. 1.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>12</sup> *The New York Times*, January 24, 1971, p. 14, and *Yugoslav News Bulletin*, No. 468, January 27, 1971, pp. 2–4.

central purpose the expansion of the economic as well as the political autonomy of the constituent republics. Here is one Yugoslav commentary on the proposals from an official publication:

The most substantive purpose of the reorganization is to deprive the federal state organs of the right arbitrarily to appropriate to themselves the social capital accumulation, and to distribute it themselves, and to play the role of investor and carrier of enlarged economic reproduction. . . . By abolishing the elements of economic statist domination over the republics, it is held, not only will the social relations of self-management be fortified, but the equality and sovereignty of the republics will gain fresh meaning.<sup>13</sup>

Assuming these reforms do go through without major modification, economic development and balance will become the primary responsibility of the republics, rather than the federal government. The knotty and potentially disruptive issue of the north-south development gap is to be dealt with apparently by placing even more responsibility upon the underdeveloped republics themselves, although long-term development financing will continue to be available, on a loan basis, through the Federal Fund for the Underdeveloped Regions. In effect, these reforms signal the final demise of centrally-imposed egalitarianism in economic development and living standards and will institutionalize the development gap for many years to come. As such, they run counter to a significant body of opinion among the older (and now largely discredited) members of the party, as well as some idealistic young people.

Perhaps there is no other choice. If Yugoslavia is to remain competitive in the world market (and thereby steadily to improve her overall standard of living) she must continue to release and encourage those sectors of her economy that can best compete in the world market. If these sectors happen to be located for the most part in the more developed regions of Yugoslavia, so be it. Perhaps this harsh policy will somehow stimulate the remaining regions to make the efforts and sacrifices necessary to "catch up." But one is

entitled to wonder if there will continue to be a Yugoslavia within which to catch up.

Ultimately the key to Yugoslavia's future may lie in the realm of foreign relations, which have not been the focus of this article, but which may nonetheless provide a concluding thought. For all the prejudices and resentments which set apart Yugoslavs of differing nationalities, there is still a strong loyalty to the "New Yugoslavia" as a polity that has succeeded in maintaining, over the past quarter-century, a precarious existence between East and West. The Yugoslav strategy of "active non-alignment," while it has fallen far short of its purpose of creating a coherent third world force in international politics, has still established an image of a unique Yugoslav role in world affairs. Recent successful trade negotiations with both the European Common Market and Comecon (the Soviet-bloc counterpart of E.E.C.) have further enhanced this image, as did the state visit of United States President Richard Nixon last fall. The restoration of full diplomatic relations with Communist China, on the one hand, and the Vatican, on the other, were two very impressive Yugoslav initiatives on the 1970 diplomatic calendar. President Tito played a central role in the Third Conference of Non-Aligned Countries held in September in Zambia. Yugoslavia has clearly "arrived" as a medium power.

The loyalty which Yugoslavs feel for contemporary Yugoslavia is difficult to gauge. It certainly is not strong enough to prevent internal bickering. On the other hand, should foreign powers, or power blocs, attempt to take advantage of the internal strains that surely lie ahead for Yugoslavia, there would probably be a compensatory reconciliation among the feuding nationalities. In the last analysis, the future of the new Yugoslav nation-state may depend more on its environment than its internal workings.

---

Stephen S. Anderson formerly taught at Marlboro College and Boston University. East European and Soviet affairs are his particular interest and he has traveled widely in the Balkans.

<sup>13</sup> B. Savic, "Self-Governed Federalism," *Yugoslav Life*, XVI, 1 (January, 1971), p. 2.

---

*"Although the short-term outlook for change in Czechoslovakia is bleak, the long-term outlook is not so hopeless. . . . If the Soviet Union undergoes . . . a civilizing process, its East European commonwealth might become an acceptable security framework within which the Czechs and Slovaks and, possibly, other satellites might find a satisfactory accommodation for their national aspirations."*

## Czechoslovakia Three Springs Later

BY VACLAV E. MARES

*Professor Emeritus of Economics, The Pennsylvania State University*

SINCE MODERN CZECHOSLOVAKIA was founded in 1918, she has lost her national independence three times: in 1938, when the Munich Agreement handed her over to Adolf Hitler; in 1948, when the putsch of her own Communist party handed her over to Josef Stalin; and in 1968, when the August invasion of the Warsaw Pact armies robbed her people of all the gains of her political freedom fighters of the eight preceding months.

In the last quarter of the third year of Czechoslovakia's occupation, nothing is left of the reforms by which Alexander Dubcek and his colleagues tried to return freedom, democracy and prosperity to their countrymen. After some hesitation about how to dispose of him, Dubcek was allowed to disappear from public life in the summer of 1970 without any show trial. His former associates are now either abroad or have been shifted to jobs where they cannot "harm" their country. People have returned again to a posture of non-participation in political affairs, a posture they had adopted, with a short interruption after the war, for the preceding

30 years. To an observer of post-invasion developments in Czechoslovakia this seemed like an ironic reversal of the known historical formula: the new order changeth and giveth way to the old.

A comparison of post-invasion events in Czechoslovakia from year to year reveals how determined her people were to resist Moscow's intentions and how the re-Sovietization of her institutions was accomplished. During the first year after the invasion, the Russians tried hard to be accepted by Czechs and Slovaks in their homelands as their friends and protectors. When they did not find fitting replacements, they left Dubcek and his colleagues as titular leaders of Czechoslovakia and hoped that Dubcek would repay them for this display of confidence by swinging public opinion in their favor. In spite of their basic distrust of ethnic minority rights, they gave Dubcek a chance to increase his popularity in his homeland, Slovakia. With some reluctance, they agreed that the plan of Czechoslovakia's federalization could go into effect in 1969. By this plan Dubcek hoped to satisfy old Slovak claims for more autonomy in their regional affairs.<sup>1</sup>

The change in popular attitudes which the Soviet leaders hoped to achieve in Czechoslovakia needed to be given time. Therefore they showed a relative tolerance toward those who, in street demonstrations, in group reso-

<sup>1</sup> For the historical background of the antagonism between Czechs and Slovaks see Vaclav E. Mares, "The Progress of Czechoslovakia's Industrialization and its Effect upon National Unity," in *Czechoslovakia Past and Present*, Vol. I, p. 183, edited by Miloslav Rechcigl, Mouton Publishers, The Hague.

lutions, or in the press, continued to defy them. They even pretended not to notice the "Hang Brezhnev" tenor of the mass demonstrations that erupted after the funeral of Jan Palach, the student whose suicide by fire on Prague's historical St. Wenceslaw's Square was the most electrifying example of the ardor of the liberal student movement.

For two months after that tragic event, Soviet leaders waited to see whether Dubcek would correct the people's "confused" ideas about their presence in Czechoslovakia. At the end of March, 1969, their patience ran out, after the double victory of Czechoslovakia's team over the Soviet team in the ice hockey world championship when the exhilaration of the cheering crowds in the streets of Prague ended with the ransacking of some Soviet window displays and office equipment. Needless to say, had it not been that occasion, some later event would have sparked the explosion of the pending showdown between the Kremlin's determination to bring Czechoslovakia back under its control and the country's determination to resist it.

### THE PARTY PURGE

Three days after the ice hockey affair, Soviet Minister of Defense Marshal A. A. Grechko arrived unannounced in Prague. This marked the end of the relatively mild period of Czechoslovakia's occupation. First rumors spread that Bohemia and Moravia would become autonomous territories under Soviet administration and that Slovakia would become a new Soviet republic. Then people were intimidated by threats of a military administration. Soon, however, it became evident that the Soviet leaders preferred to avoid extreme steps and that they wanted to try once more to bring Czechoslovakia to heel with the help of her own people. Therefore they decided to undertake a thorough purge of the apparatus of the Czechoslovak Com-

munist party. They did not trust the reappearing oldtimers of the discredited Antonin Novotny clique and preferred to entrust the purge to new Czech and Slovak supporters of the Moscow orthodoxy. The Novotny men were kept in reserve for less important assignments.

The theory of the "creeping collaborationism" of ambitious individuals, when a foreign occupation does not have any foreseeable time limit, also started to prove its validity in Czechoslovakia. Thus Gustav Husak, who had spent nine years in jail for his "Slovak nationalist extremism" during the Stalin-Novotny era and who, in 1968, supported Dubcek in his early reform efforts, did not hesitate to turn against him soon after the invasion. By his public criticism of some Dubcek reforms while Dubcek was still in office, Husak gained a reputation in Moscow as a "realist" or a "centrist." This predestined him for the party leadership when Dubcek was ousted in April, 1969.

With Husak at the helm, the party's purge went into full swing. Pro-Soviet conservatives replaced liberals in all party organs and in all strategic administrative positions. Two thousand regional and factory commissions were set up to weed out liberals from the party's rank and file. Excommunications from the party were hitting all social groups: former ministers, members of the Parliament, members of the Supreme Court, trade union leaders, university professors, performing artists and popular athletes. On circulars which every member had to fill out before he could apply for a new membership card, he had to confess and to recant all his 1968 sins of action and thought; he also had to agree to submit to party discipline with "selflessness and inner enthusiasm."<sup>2</sup>

The goal was to reduce the party's size to some 900,000 from the 1,675,000 membership of the Dubcek era. This corresponded to the size of the Soviet Communist party in proportion to the population of the two countries. The purge seems to have accomplished this objective by the end of 1970. Husak's public complaints about "the workers' unjustified solidarity attitudes" which

<sup>2</sup> Quoted excerpts from speeches and passages from laws, circulars, and other documents are partly this author's translations from the Prague daily *Rude Pravo*; partly they are reproduced from reports of foreign correspondents of the *Economist* (London) and *The New York Times*.



were delaying the work of the screening commissions indicated how difficult it was for the commissions in the factories to find those who were tainted by participation in the democratic socialism of the "Prague Spring."

### RESOVIENTIZATION

While the party purge was under way, new men were replacing the Dubcek team in the top positions of the country's administration. Most zealous in the fulfillment of tasks assigned to them from Moscow were Lubomir Strougal, the country's new Premier, Jaromir Hrbek, who took over the Department of Education, and Miloslav Bruzek, the new minister of culture. In spite of warnings, the first anniversary of the invasion attracted big crowds to the streets of all the major cities and again many anti-Soviet slogans were heard and read. Then an executive decree, "For Strengthening and Defending Public Order," marked a return to the police state of the Stalin era. It gave administrative agencies a free hand to detain and investigate suspects without a court warrant. A single-judge court could impose penalties of up to five years banishment from the defendant's place of residence. The restrictive provisions of this decree were later incorporated into other new laws which carried no time limit.

Another blow to freedom was a drastic restriction of travel abroad. At the same time, the government tried to repatriate some 70,000 refugees who had left the country after the invasion. The first approach to them was an offer of immunity promised to those who would return by the end of 1969. When this approach proved ineffective, the government resorted to threats of reprisals against the refugees' relatives at home. As far as is known, only a few of the 1968 refugees yielded to this alternate wooing and intimidation. Thus, as in 1939 and 1948, Czechoslovakia again lost many artists and scientists, educators and other men of intellect and skills whom she had educated and trained and whose services she badly needed.

<sup>3</sup> In the jargon of Czech students MELS stands for courses in Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalinism.

Minister Hrbek took care of the re-Sovietization of Czechoslovakia's school system. Shortly after the invasion, the commander of Soviet ground forces had termed the Czech schools "a nest of counter revolutionaries"; he had accused the schools of destroying the love for the Soviet Union that he believed to be "deep in the hearts of Czechoslovak children." The Soviet commander had threatened to send troops into the schools unless the teachers adopted a more favorable attitude toward the Soviet Union. This threat, which was ineffective, became the subject of an official government complaint to Moscow. Later, in the third year of the occupation, Minister Hrbek announced that the representatives of the Red Army would visit Czechoslovak high schools for "informal chats" with the students.

Other actions of Hrbek illustrate his tactics. All teachers and university professors who signed the "Two Thousand Words" freedom manifesto of June, 1968, were asked to repudiate it publicly or to face the loss of their jobs. New textbooks were announced for all levels of the school system to provide a "true picture" of events prior to and following 1968. Children were encouraged to listen to conversations at home and report in school all that would be in conflict with what they were taught. Students were warned that a Dubcek cult was worse than a Stalin cult.

The universities' autonomy, which had been restored to them in the spring of 1968, was jettisoned before the end of 1969 by a new amendment to the law on universities. This gave Hrbek a free hand for the radical revision of all curricula and course offerings. Many social and political science courses were dropped and the old MELS courses<sup>3</sup> were reintroduced and made mandatory for all degree candidates. The liberal Student Union was dissolved but the attempts to establish a new, conformist student organization were ignored by the students.

Minister of Culture Miloslav Bruzek had to face the toughest reaction against his actions. One after another, he had to dissolve dozens of cultural organizations which boycotted his orders to expel or to investigate

specific members. The Newsmen's Union lost its leadership with the dismissal of its whole presidium, and it was placed under a commission appointed by and reporting to the minister. The Writers' Union refused to comply with the minister's order to expel all members who stayed abroad and with his request to revoke all "erroneous resolutions." This, too, led to the suspension of its officers. The union continues to function only unofficially, since the control of its finances and of its publishing funds has been taken over by the ministry of culture.

Another problem which exposed Minister Bruzek to ridicule in the eyes of the public was his selection of "proper" programs for Czechoslovakia's theaters and cinemas. The latter were forced to reintroduce Soviet films for which only compulsory school attendance and tickets freely distributed in factories secured audiences. Even so, spells of violent coughing and sneezing marked the appearance of well-known Soviet personalities on the screen. Molière was among the playwrights who failed to pass the test of Bruzek's censors. When the public reacted with laughter or applause in the "wrong places," performances were suspended. In their forced retreat from participation in the political life of their country, the people started to use their theaters as sounding boards for their feelings and to look for every hidden meaning in the text of the plays, whether or not such was intended by the author.

Of the nonconforming liberal magazines, such as *Reporter*, *Listy*, *Politika* and *Zitrek*,

which were in the vanguard of the reform movement, none exists today. They were replaced by the official magazines *Tvorba* and *Tribuna*, which compete in expressions of support for the regime and in attacks and charges of "subversion" directed against the Writers' Union.

The NEM, the new market-oriented model for the revitalization of Czechoslovakia's economy, also became a victim of re-Sovietization.<sup>4</sup> First to be eliminated were the planned workers' councils in industrial establishments which, following Yugoslavia's example, were supposed to participate in their management. This concept had always been considered as heretical by orthodox party ideologists in Moscow. The new party bosses did not want to take the political risks inherent in market economics and in an emphasis on profit; therefore again they restricted the authority of plant managers and returned them to the strict control of central planning agencies. Other parts of the NEM had to be scrapped not because of ideological objections but because they could not function without the remaining parts of the plan. The NEM's main architect, Ota Sik, and his associates were accused of attempts to promote economic reforms for political aims; they were said to have placed the blame for earlier mistakes in the management of the economy "on the substance of socialism itself." Thus collapsed their honest attempt to extricate the run-down productive machine of Czechoslovakia's economy from the morass of the nineteenth century theories of Marx and Engels.

## THE LEGALITY ISSUE

When the Soviet leaders saw that their invasion of Czechoslovakia prompted expressions of sympathy and moral indignation from such personal and ideological antipodes as the Pope, Chinese Chairman Mao Tse-tung, United States President Lyndon Johnson and the heads of all Communist parties outside the Soviet orbit, they became concerned to prove the invasion's "legality." They first advanced an "invitation fiction"—the story that they entered Czechoslovakia in

<sup>4</sup> For more about NEM and the developments that preceded the Dubcek period see Vaclav E. Mares, "Czechoslovakia's Half Century," in *Current History*, April, 1967, p. 200. For the best documented account of the Dubcek era and of its liquidation see Pavel Tigrid, "Czechoslovakia: A Post-Mortem," in *Survey—A Journal of Soviet and East European Studies*, Winter/Spring, 1970, p. 112 (London: Oxford University Press). On post-invasion developments in Czechoslovakia, see also: Alvin Rubinstein, "Czechoslovakia in Transition," *Current History*, April, 1969, p. 206; Edward Taborsky, "The Return to Normalcy," *Problems of Communism*, November-December, 1970, p. 31; Zdenek Suda, *The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969); Milton Mayer, *The Art of the Impossible—A Study of the Czech Resistance*, (Santa Barbara: The Fund for the Republic, 1968).

response to an appeal for help by some of her representatives against counter-revolutionary forces. When they could not find any volunteers of political stature willing to accept retroactively the role of those who allegedly issued this appeal, they abandoned it and replaced it with an ideological explanation. This was launched a month after the invasion by an editorial in Moscow's *Pravda* under the title, "Sovereignty and International Duties of Socialistic Countries." It defined the concept of "socialistic" sovereignty as opposed to "abstract" sovereignty, and rejected the contention that Czechoslovakia's sovereignty had been violated. This article became the basis of the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine which advanced the right of the Soviet Union to intervene in the affairs of any other Communist state if subversion or distortion of its socialist system would endanger the existence of other states. References to this doctrine were then included in agreements that had to be signed by Czechoslovakia's leaders so that, by implication, they justified the invasion. The Soviet leaders could in this way defend their action on their domestic front. However, non-Soviet Communist parties did not accept the validity of the Brezhnev Doctrine and continued to object to the invasion.<sup>5</sup>

In view of the anticipated confrontation with other Communist party leaders at the Soviet Communist party congress scheduled for the end of March, 1971, the Kremlin needed to strengthen the legality of the Czech invasion. Therefore, two years later, it revived its original invitation theory. Anyone who would not accept the Brezhnev Doctrine—this must have been the Kremlin's reasoning—must see proof that Moscow had received genuine calls for assistance from Prague. However, Husak's own post-invasion statement that "none of the leading organs of the party or state requested the intervention or invited the armies in" was in blunt contradiction with the invitation theory. Obviously, for a long time Husak had been under strong

Soviet pressure to correct it. He yielded slowly. In October, 1969, he acknowledged that the invasion was an act of "brotherly assistance." In May, 1970, he expressed in a speech the gratitude of his people to the Soviet Union for "all her help." On other occasions he spoke of "groups of counterrevolutionaries in his country which had needed to be crushed." In each public pronouncement he came one step closer to what the Soviet leaders wanted to hear. Finally, in the December, 1970, meeting of the party's Central Committee he took the final Soviet-dictated step in his alignment. He endorsed with his authority a long resolution which was aimed at a fundamental rewriting of recent Czechoslovakian history and which unequivocally stated that "thousands of the party's rank and file invited the Soviet forces to enter Czechoslovakia in August, 1968."

In the same way, Husak eventually discarded the "Action Program" of April, 1968, which was the charter of the whole reform movement. While the necessity of its revision was announced by Dubcek after his visit to Moscow four days after the invasion (the visit to which he was taken in handcuffs), and while some parts of its application had been officially suspended, Husak himself had continued to give assurances that other parts of the program had not been scrapped and that the government would continue to carry them out. Now, in the same document of the party's Central Committee mentioned above, the Action Program was finally dismissed as an "incorrect and invalid document which cannot be used as a basis . . . for practical policies of the party." This was the official burial of Dubcek's bold attempt to establish socialist rule with human face in Czechoslovakia.

### THE PEOPLE'S BALANCE SHEET

In terms of the new hardships imposed on him and of the benefits (if any) he received, what was the price which the common man in Czechoslovakia had to pay for the failure of Dubcek's experiment? These are the new liabilities of his present situation. He is now living under an occupation for which no time

<sup>5</sup> For more about the Brezhnev Doctrine see Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Soviet Aims in East Europe," *Current History*, October, 1970, p. 206.

limit has been set. It would be unrealistic to expect that the Soviet Union would voluntarily decide to terminate the occupation after its leaders learned by experience how the population regards them.

The common man is again deprived of the right to travel abroad (travel restrictions were considerably relaxed in the last years of the Novotny administration). In his dealings with local authorities in such matters as employment, housing, health and school affairs, he is exposed to the arbitrary moods of the new party bosses. Former regimes could claim that their officials spoke at least for the Communist party's rank and file. This is no longer the case; the present administration was recruited by Moscow's agents from the pathological dregs of the nation—to use the words with which the late Thomas G. Masaryk, Czechoslovakia's first President, once branded a similar group of political opportunists. During the 20 years of Communist rule, some well qualified specialists moved into responsible administrative positions. Besides the new party apparatchniks, no such specialists are in sight today. A living descendant of the good soldier Schweik showed his disgust by scribbling on a street corner in Prague three words which in English meant "We are sorry, Tonda" (Tonda is a Czech nickname for Antonin). This apologetic evocation of Novotny's ouster, probably because of its simplicity, for weeks last summer escaped the attention of Husak's police, who otherwise have to remove daily from the streetwalls all expressions of protest that reappear there overnight.

As every cloud has its silver lining, so the Dubcek episode, in spite of its failure, has had certain positive values for the common man. First, people learned to talk again after having whispered for 30 years. They opened their hearts to each other and found to their surprise that, whether they were party members or not, they were thinking the same way about most national issues. If before the invasion there was still some distrust between party members and non-members, it disappeared completely after the invasion. The dividing line moved to the very edge of

the national community, separating from it only the party's new leadership. The informers are now more easily identifiable, which keeps the communication channels more open than they were in the 1950's and early 1960's. The people were freed from panslavistic dreams which were responsible for many errors in judgment in their earlier political thinking. They took part in a distinguished chapter of their country's history and felt proud of their leaders. Men like Dubcek, Smrkovsky, Kriegel or, among the writers, Vaculik, Havel, Goldstucker and many others gave them shining examples of personal courage.

### THE SVOBODA PARADOX

The only political survivor of Czechoslovakia's glorious spring of 1968 is Ludvik Svoboda, who at this writing still functions in the ceremonial role of the country's President. His name, which in the Czech language means "freedom," is a bizarre paradox. In the process of the Moscow-directed normalization, he had to sign many laws repealing the civil liberties which the reform program had sought to restore.

There is an interesting analogy between the role Ludvik Svoboda is playing in relation to Brezhnev and his associates and the role which, 30 years ago, Czechoslovakia's President Emil Hacha played vis-a-vis Hitler and his henchmen in the Nazi-occupied country. Both men were drafted for the presidency in critical transition periods of their country. Both were close to the age of 70 and both had completed distinguished professional careers.

Hacha was a jurist, the first president of the Czechoslovak Supreme Court and a member of the Permanent Court of International Justice in The Hague; Svoboda followed a military career and, as a general in World War II, became commander of his country's volunteers in the Red Army. Both men showed a remarkable fortitude in certain situations: Hacha when he accepted the candidacy at a time when—after Munich—the ordeal connected with the presidential function was easily foreseeable; Svoboda (who



had accepted his post when the situation seemed stable) when, after the invasion, he declined to negotiate with the Soviet leaders without his jailed associates. Both men were subjected to night-long negotiations and in the early morning hours were forced to accept agreements which had far-reaching consequences. In the later years of their presidencies, both men showed a dwindling resistance to the pressures to which they were exposed, an obvious result of their fading physical and intellectual capacities. Both were the victims of circumstances and not of their personal ambitions and neither should be regarded as a collaborator.<sup>6</sup>

### DUBCEK'S ROLE IN RETROSPECT

One is tempted to ask whether the violent Soviet reaction to Dubcek's reform program, or to the speed with which it was put into effect, could have been anticipated. A comparison with developments in other countries of the Soviet bloc can offer some clues.

There were many deviations from the Moscow pattern of socialist administration among the countries of East Europe. Under the Gomulka regime, Poland decollectivized her agriculture, broadened her cultural and trade contacts with Western countries, and received dollar loans and most-favored-nation treatment in trade from the United States. Rumania repeatedly disobeyed suggestions from the Moscow-dominated COMECON both in her domestic and foreign economic policy. Recently, she refused to endorse the Brezhnev Doctrine by rejecting a reference to it in the new Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union; she was punished only by the cancellation of Brezhnev's visit to Bucharest for the signing of the treaty. Hungary has readmitted private foreign capital into her industrial enterprises and has granted these enterprises many liberal concessions in their management. Artists, writers, students and other professionals in all the East European countries have regained much of their free-

dom of expression although it had been kept mostly under a kind of hot-house control. In the early 1960's, the Soviet Union itself spearheaded attempts to rejuvenate the over-centralized socialist economies by granting more independence and responsibility to managers of industrial enterprises. Even the rehabilitation of the victims of Stalinist years became a well tested routine in other countries of the Soviet bloc.

In Czechoslovakia, all such developments were delayed by the repressive rule of the Stalinist Novotny clique. Thus the Dubcek reform program was only a catching-up effort. It is true that no other country of the bloc experienced such comprehensive reform. Yet had the reforms been limited to areas in which deviations from Moscow's orthodoxy had been tested earlier in other countries of the bloc, they would probably have been tolerated in Czechoslovakia, even if the Soviet leaders had not liked them.

The complete removal of censorship early in 1968 modified the tenor of Czechoslovakia's reform movement. It opened the floodgate to many old grievances and recriminations which, as they were aired in the press, were daily increasing the pressure on Dubcek's reform program. Some demands he rejected, not because they were unjustified, but because he did not want to provoke the Kremlin's anger. He tried to secure Moscow's confidence by supporting (against other more popular candidates) General Svoboda for the presidency of the republic; Svoboda had received the "Hero of Soviet Labor" order from the Soviets. Dubcek disavowed and removed from his high post in the Department of Defense General Prchlik, who had angered the Soviet leaders by an article demanding a revision of the Warsaw Pact. He rejected the demand for the reactivation of the old Social Democratic Workers party because he remembered the Soviet orthodox contention that only the Communist party could truly represent the workers' interests. Yet he did not reject one demand which the Soviet oligarchs found equally objectionable—the demand for the restoration in Czechoslovakia of a multi-party political system. The inclusion of this

<sup>6</sup> At the end of the war, such charges were brought up against President Hacha, but he died a few weeks later, saving embarrassment to those who would have had to justify such an accusation.



demand in Dubcek's Action Program of April, 1968, and Dubcek's unyielding attitude on it was the stumbling bloc in his negotiations with the Soviet leaders and, more than anything else, must have prompted their decision to prevent him from carrying it out—by persuasion, if possible, or by force, if necessary.

There was a party logic in this reasoning, a logic which can be traced back to the very beginning of the Communist rule in Russia. To Brezhnev, as to Khrushchev, Stalin and Lenin before him, a multiparty system has always appeared to be a perversion and distortion of Marxism. It has always been one of the party's axioms that, in order to stay in power, it should never allow another political party to coexist. This is why Lenin, soon after the Bolshevik revolution, emphatically declined to cooperate with the Mensheviks or with any other leftist group; and this is why, in 1938, Bukharin was executed when Stalin learned of his support for the second party idea. To preserve the monopoly of a single party became such a basic tenet of Communist policy that not even such a non-conformist as Yugoslav President Tito tolerated attempts to change this rule; this was the starting point of his conflict with Miloslav Djilas.

Thus when Dubcek disclosed his intention to readmit the old political parties (except the Social Democrats) to full participation in the affairs of the country, the Soviet leaders must have regarded him as a student who had not done his assigned reading in Lenin's books. They ignored his assurances that his party would maintain a leading role. They probably saw in Dubcek's self-confidence a proof not of his dishonesty but of his naiveté. In their way of reasoning, they might have been right. Had the multiparty system been reintroduced into Czechoslovakia, Dubcek with all his popularity would probably have been unable to protect the party against the people's exasperation over its past sins. In free elections, people would probably have eliminated the Communist party from the country's political scene—not so much on ideological grounds, but mainly because it represented the establishment which for 20

years had been mishandling their national affairs.

The Soviet leaders could not risk such a course of events. The demonstration effect of such a development in Czechoslovakia could have been devastating for all parties in the Soviet empire. This is why the Soviet leaders reacted so vehemently to Dubcek's intention. The ideological motivation of their action was, of course, a smoke screen. Yet not even the concern for the Soviet Union's national security explains their reaction fully. Of equal importance must have been concern for their personal power positions and for their own political survival.

In summary, it seems that Dubcek was not firm enough in resisting the demands for the expansion of his reform program, and that in the course of its application he did not check realistically the acceptability to the Kremlin of some of its tenets. Had he done so, he could probably have assured his countrymen substantial and lasting relaxations in their ways of life within the one-party system. With more foresight and experience with Moscow's leaders, the complete collapse of his experiment might have been avoided.

It would be unfair, however, to blame Dubcek for the outcome of his efforts. He was catapulted into the nation's leadership from a regional secretarial office. His unsophisticated integrity was a bar to the maneuvering which the nation's problems obviously required. His strong commitment to his people barred him from saying "no" more frequently to their demands.

*(Continued on page 306)*

---

Vaclav E. Mares came to the United States on a diplomatic mission for Czechoslovakia following World War II. In 1948, he resigned from government service and joined the faculty of The Pennsylvania State University where he taught for 21 years in the area of international economics. On his frequent research and lecture trips to Europe, Professor Mares has studied development and trade policies both in East and West European countries and has written on related topics for this and other American journals.

---

*"So far, the Kádár regime has not pushed its political reform with the same vigor and determination as it has promoted the New Economic Mechanism."*

## Hungary: The Politics of Reform

BY CHARLES GATI

*Associate Professor of Political Science, Union College*

DURING THE COURSE of a marathon interview with a leading Hungarian ideologist last summer, the visitor referred to an article published in the party daily *Népszabadság* the previous day. The article in question<sup>1</sup> had strongly criticized Western reports and interpretations for having drawn too favorable an image of Hungarian developments.

The party daily argued that Hungary's policies were basically the same as those of other East European countries; hence Western emphases on the János Kádár regime's distinctiveness were intended to embarrass Kádár and to drive a wedge between Hungary and her allies. What, then, the visitor asked, would the regime like to see written about Hungary in the West—surely, unfavorable reports would only tend to undermine the country's pursuit of Western trade, tourism and the like. Or was it possible, the visitor persisted, that the *Népszabadság* article was commissioned to allay Soviet fears about "capitalist" experimentation in Hungary? After a period of embarrassing silence, the Hungarian ideologue's answer was both cautious and revealing: "Naturally, we are forever mindful of how our friends in the Soviet Union or for that matter elsewhere in East Europe perceive our policies."

The answer is revealing because of its implied acknowledgment of the complexities

of Hungarian political life. Inside and outside the country, questions are being raised about the nature of János Kádár's regime. Are its policies as revolutionary as claimed or as reformist as denied? Is the regime a genuine and faithful friend of the Soviet Union and of the Warsaw Pact alliance the Soviet Union leads? Does the Kádár regime support Soviet foreign policies to obtain Soviet backing for its own reformist, semi-independent domestic policies?

That such questions are raised is in itself significant. They correctly suggest that Hungary has come a long way since the ill-fated, anti-Soviet revolution of 1956. Fifteen years after that revolution, the talk in Budapest is not about Soviet tanks but about Western technology, not about terror but about techniques of persuasion, not about centralization but about decentralization. In the economic realm, the regime's innovative New Economic Mechanism is based not on demands for additional "sacrifices" by the population but on private and collective incentives and barely hidden appeals to material interests.

In the political realm, tolerance toward divergent viewpoints has replaced officially sanctioned, artificial unanimity; the new electoral reform, for example, provides a choice among candidates for political office (to be sure, within defined limits and with disappointing results so far) and trade unions have assumed more leeway to represent the economic interests of factory workers. In

<sup>1</sup> József Horváth, "Egynémelyek tévedéseiről" ["The Erroneous Ideas of Some People"], *Népszabadság*, July 26, 1970.

the cultural realm, Western films, plays and books are easily available, and Hungarian cultural and intellectual life is based on the party's willingness to allow for the expression of both Marxist and non-Marxist tendencies.

Perhaps most important, the regime's political leadership style reflects its interest in avoiding the "we-they" dichotomy of pre-1956 days which had separated leaders from the people, causing mutual mistrust, suspicion and, ultimately, the upsurge of revolutionary sentiments. While the pre-1956 leaders used to sharpen this dichotomy by suggesting that, "Whoever is not with us is against us," the slogan under Kádár has become, "Whoever is not against us is with us."

### SEARCH FOR LEGITIMACY

Kádár's search for legitimacy and popular approval was evidenced at the recent 10th Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' party, held in Budapest at the end of November, 1970. Stressing the importance of an "alliance policy" between Communists and non-Communists, he urged the party to "work for the people and through the people; there is no other way." One of Kádár's deputies, Central Committee Secretary Béla Biszku, elaborated on this theme as he specified the qualities of "good leaders." Speaking as he did for the party, Biszku declared that all party and government leaders should (a) display a humane attitude towards the people, (b) prepare their subordinates for the assumption of important tasks and responsible positions; (c) have the courage to contradict their superiors and at the same time demonstrate patience and respect towards subordinates, and (d) avoid the danger of being overwhelmed by their own sense of power and importance.<sup>2</sup>

Such appeals for humane, responsive and flexible leadership must be understood against the background of Kádár's personality and the regime's political dilemmas. A party member since 1932 when he was only 20 years old, active in the small anti-Nazi resistance

movement during World War II, secretary of the Budapest party organization after the war, Kádár became one of 14 members of the party's Political Committee and Minister of the Interior in 1948. Three years later—as a consequence of a factional struggle between the so-called Muscovites (Rákosi, Gerő, Révai and Farkas) and a number of Communist leaders who had spent the war years in Hungary (Kállai, Donáth, Losonczy and Kádár himself)—he was purged, arrested, accused of Titoism and tortured in prison. Released in 1954—after Stalin's death and during Imre Nagy's "New Course"—Kádár refused to ally himself with Nagy's anti-Stalinist forces.

A cautious centrist who was caught between the Stalinist Rákosi and the revisionist Nagy, he nonetheless joined Nagy's second (revolutionary) government in October, 1956, and, in a radio speech, he spoke of "the glorious uprising of our people." But after the Soviet Union crushed the revolution and installed him as head of both the party and the new government, Kádár soon echoed the Soviet version of the "counterrevolution," alluding to Nagy as a traitor and approving his subsequent execution. Under Kádár's leadership, the country's fiercely independent-minded peasants were also forced into collective farms between 1959 and 1961.

As he turned against Nagy, consolidated the hegemony of the party, and stressed Hungary's unfailing pro-Soviet stance, Kádár by necessity had to rely on the party bureaucracy which was dominated by dogmatic, Stalinist, Rákosi-type elements. While it supported Kádár the quisling, it remained skeptical and suspicious of Kádár the martyr of Stalinist purges. Accordingly, Kádár had to move cautiously when, around 1960, he seems to have decided to terminate repression and pursue his own "New Course." However, it was only after Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's victory over the hard-line dogmatists at the 22nd Congress of the Soviet Communist party in October, 1961, that the specifics of Kádár's new orientation—commonly identified as "goulash socialism"—became clear.

<sup>2</sup> For a summary of Biszku's speech, see *Radio Free Europe (R.F.E.) Situation Report*, Munich (November 26, 1970), pp. 2-3.

The initial deeds were impressive. The widely hated system of internal exile and internment without trial was abolished. Persons involved in the infamous Rákosi trials were fired from positions of responsibility. The number of forced labor camps was reduced and political prisoners were freed. The jamming of Western radio stations ceased. In a more positive vein, the regime made high school performance, talent and potential—rather than parents' party affiliation or class origin—the criteria for admission to the universities. In addition, the Iron Curtain was lowered as travel to the West was allowed; tourism from the West, in fact, was now highly encouraged.

Still fighting the party bureaucracy's resistance to his policies, Kádár felt compelled to address himself to the goal of obtaining the trust of the people and of leading by persuasion rather than coercion. At the Third Congress of the Patriotic People's Front in 1964, for example, he explained the party's more tolerant and humane approach in the following way:

If a person does not have sufficient gumption to acquire knowledge of the somewhat more strenuous and longer method of persuasion, and if his leadership skill stops at the recipe of "expel—jail," he cannot get on in public life any longer today, and still less in the future. We shall fight against such people. After all, it is necessary to remember what caused the difficult situation in 1956. How did the process of dissolution which afterward provided favorable ground for all kinds of counterrevolutionary and revisionist incitement begin? It began with suspicion. But every rational person must understand that the whole nation cannot be suspect. Our starting point must be that the people are our people, that we are here for the people, and that when the people put us in a responsible post they do so for the reason that we should work for them.<sup>3</sup>

Kádár's approach, with its populist undertones, threatened the monopolistic, elitist tendencies of the party bureaucracy. Specifically, the bureaucracy felt that its privileged

position vis-à-vis non-party specialists would be weakened in view of Kádár's affirmation of trust and persuasion and his subsequent emphasis on talent, expertise, training and ability. The fact that if one were not a member of the party or did not claim to be a Communist, his road to professional advancement would no longer be blocked, was presumably regarded as alien and dangerous by the party bureaucrats. Thus, the struggle for the adoption of the New Economic Mechanism in the early and mid-1960's was fought not merely over questions of economic management and priorities; more than anything else, it involved a political struggle both with and within the party bureaucracy. Given the Marxist proposition according to which the economic "base" of a society determines its political "superstructure," Kádár's opponents argued that the very foundations of party rule were endangered by the proposed system of economic decentralization, competition and incentives. Years later, Kádár's protégé and the main proponent of the economic reform, Central Committee Secretary Rezső Nyers, recalled the bitterness of the struggle by mentioning that Kádár, in person, had had to participate in "deep and thorough debates"; and Kádár himself noted that around 1965 not only economists but members of the Central Committee had held "essentially divergent opinions."

Thus, the first decade of Kádár's rule may conveniently be divided into two periods. From late 1956 to about 1960, he reestablished firm party rule; he eliminated, or at least consented to the elimination of, the revisionist, anti-Stalinist Nagy group; and he forcefully collectivized agriculture. During the next, transitional, phase, which lasted from 1960 to 1966–1967, he methodically and systematically, although always cautiously, prepared the way for the modernization of Hungarian society through economic and political reform.

## ECONOMIC REFORM

The idea of economic reform was conceived as early as 1957 when the party established 11 committees of economists, headed by István

<sup>3</sup> *Népszabadság*, March 21, 1964, as quoted in William F. Robinson, "The Pattern of Reform in Hungary, Part One," *Special R.F.E. Report*, Munich (July 27, 1970), pp. 68–69.

Varga, a highly regarded non-party expert. Varga's findings and recommendations, including his emphasis on indirect methods of economic guidance and his critique of exaggerated centralization, were first published, then authoritatively rejected, and then—reflecting the political twists and turns of those years—implemented. Specifically, between 1959 and 1965, (a) a four-tier pricing system was introduced which specified fixed prices for some products, maximum prices and limits on prices for others, and free or market-determined prices for the rest; (b) industrial management was decentralized, reducing the jurisdiction of the ministries and increasing the jurisdiction of large-scale trusts and enterprises; (c) industrial priorities were reordered, emphasizing the profitable electronics, telecommunications, chemical and pharmaceutical industries for which resources were easily available; (d) quality norms were introduced mainly in order to make Hungarian products competitive on foreign markets; and (e) a new profit-sharing system was instituted.

These piecemeal but partially successful measures were then incorporated into the more comprehensive New Economic Mechanism or NEM, introduced in January, 1968. At that time, new laws also went into effect regulating the role of planning authorities and inter-industry relationships. It was announced that enterprise production plans would not have to be submitted to, or in advance approved by, the Central Planning Board. Indeed, if the planning agencies were to influence enterprise production plans, they were expected to rely on the use of fiscal and monetary incentives (as in the West); by and large, they had to refrain from issuing binding directives. Moreover, in order to make the central plan more realistic and efficient, compulsory targets (relating to total output, total wages paid and the like) were reduced. The leadership announced that its ultimate objective was the freeing of practically all prices of consumer, industrial and agricultural products. The importance of

foreign trade and the need for a favorable balance of payments were underlined. Because state-owned and cooperative repair and maintenance outlets could not meet the increasing demand for services, private artisans and retail traders were encouraged to set up small plants, especially in the villages. In general terms, the Hungarian economy was steered from extensive to intensive development.

With the exception of Yugoslavia, no East European country had undertaken such fundamental measures or attempted to depart so daringly from the Soviet-type model of economic management. To be sure, Czechoslovakia had been well on her way to implement her own system of decentralization and free price formation, but the tragic end of the Alexander Dubček regime in 1968 put a halt to economic experimentation. Elsewhere in the region—in Poland, East Germany, Bulgaria and particularly Rumania—economic reform had been handicapped by concern about the reform's political implications. Thus the Hungarian model was being observed with enormous interest. (In the case of East Germany, the leadership's "interest" was combined with lightly veiled expressions of suspicion.) Thus, Hungary's New Economic Mechanism—a socialist version of the market economy—was widely perceived to have profound import, not only for Hungary but for several neighboring countries as well.

So far, the results seem good-to-excellent; the balance sheet of NEM is encouraging.<sup>4</sup> The third five-year-plan (1966–1970) was substantially overfulfilled. For the first time in many years, the 1969 foreign trade balance was positive and, as hoped, the country's agricultural growth rate surpassed the industrial rate of growth. A greater variety of goods, including new products, has become available; particularly in the countryside, the standard of living has risen. On the whole, the complicated structural revisions in the economy have proved to be workable (although the number of jurisdictional disputes—between managers and central planners, among managers, and even between unions and managers—has greatly increased).

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Robinson, *ibid.*, Part Two, pp. 1–54.



On the negative side, speakers at the recent party congress complained about low labor productivity, inadequate investment resources and insufficient agricultural mechanization. An additional source of dissatisfaction is the unwillingness of industrial managers, many of whom are also poorly trained and inexperienced, to assume new responsibilities; some still appear to prefer the easier ways of a previous era when their assignment was limited to the implementation of decisions made by central authorities. Nonetheless, and despite such problems, foreign observers strongly support the conclusion reached by Hungarian economists and by the regime itself that progress under NEM in the agricultural sector has been remarkable; the quantitative and qualitative improvement of foreign trade with East and West has been impressive; and the services have become better. The economic stagnation of the 1960's (especially between 1963 and 1966) was halted as Hungary entered the 1970's with more promising economic prospects than any of her Warsaw Pact neighbors.

### POLITICAL PROSPECTS

The political prospects are somewhat less promising. On the positive side, potentially most pioneering are changes in the political process to involve a larger segment of the population, particularly specialists and managers, in the making of decisions. While it may be premature to speak of "socialist pluralism" and although a multiparty political system is clearly out of the question, the regime—in a major theoretical revision—has concluded that, in addition to the collective interest of the state and individual interests, group interests may also be legitimately represented in a socialist society. Speaking to visiting American political scientists in the summer of 1969, Professor József Bognár, a prominent economist and semiofficial spokesman for the government, explained:

When making decisions the government pays

<sup>5</sup> József Bognár, "Initiative and Equilibrium: Major Political and Economic Issues in Hungary," *The New Hungarian Quarterly*, XI, 37 (Spring-1970), p. 27.

increased attention to the interests of groups affected by them. . . . Alternatives and different interests are taken into account before making important decisions; these are prepared with the participation of a wide spectrum of the best specialists; and the legislative is able to keep an eye on the executive.<sup>5</sup>

To be sure, the watchdog function of the legislative branch has not meant more than the revitalization of the committee system and the reintroduction of interpellations from the floor of the National Assembly. Most questions raised in this manner tend to be perfunctory and, with minor exceptions, the answers of government officials are easily "accepted." The Assembly has no genuine power to oppose executive proposals, nor does it in fact control expenditures or set priorities. And while the electoral system has been altered to allow for contested elections, with two or more candidates competing for a seat in the legislature, all nine "counter-candidates" in 1967 failed at the polls. Moreover, as the Assembly meets only three or four times a year and its sessions seldom last for more than two or three days, there is no public confidence in the seriousness of its purpose. Thus, the regime's repeated and apparently rather genuine efforts—expressed in the 1966 and 1970 electoral reform laws—have not led to viable legislative activity.

### THE LABOR CODE

Similarly, the widely advertised Labor  
(Continued on page 308)

---

---

Charles Gati is Director of the Program in Comparative Communist Studies at Union College. His articles have appeared in several scholarly journals, including *World Politics*, *Slavic Review*, *Canadian Slavic Studies*, and *East European Quarterly*. He has contributed to *The Behavioral Revolution and Communist Studies* (New York: Free Press, 1971) and *The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy: A Reader* (Chicago: Aldine, 1971). He visited Hungary in 1965, 1969 and 1970. Dr. Gati will join Columbia University's Research Institute on Communist Affairs as a Senior Fellow during the 1971-1972 academic year.

---

*"The revival of national feelings and the acceptability of Marxism combine with widespread German urges to a new orientation toward the East."*

## German Policy Toward East Europe

BY ROBERT G. WESSON

*Associate Professor of Political Science, University of California, Santa Barbara*

GERMAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS have historically followed a jagged course, as the two most numerous and strongest peoples of Europe have vacillated between the friendship dictated by what they can offer one another and the hostility generated by rivalries in the lands between them. Several times they have moved abruptly toward cooperation. In 1812, as Napoleon was pulling back from his disastrous Russian campaign, his unwilling Prussian allies broke away and joined hands with Czar Alexander. Tauroggen, where the convention was reached, became proverbial for a pro-Russian orientation, like Rapallo in a later day. Russia and Prussia (later the Bismarckian German Reich) remained good, often close friends for the greater part of a century, but in the 1880's frictions began to increase. Germany chose to support Austria and her Balkan policies, and Russia moved to an alliance with France. World War I began primarily as a contest of German against Slav, but a mauled and revolutionized Russia signed a separate peace with Germany at Brest Litovsk in March, 1918. Germany was the first country with which Soviet Russia had diplomatic relations.

The agreement of Rapallo, April 15-16, 1922, has stood ever since for the propensity of a Germany dissatisfied with her relations with the West to turn eastward. The treaty was based on the fact that a defeated and penalized Germany and a poor and distrusted if not hated Bolshevik Russia were both international pariahs with much to gain and little

to lose by mutual support. Moreover, they shared an antagonism toward a restored Poland which had occupied their former territories. In 1919, Germany had taken her first independent step since the armistice in refusing to join in the blockade of Soviet Russia, and many German rightists and militarists dreamed of somehow salvaging something from the wreckage by affiliation with the anti-Western Bolsheviks. Lenin took advantage of German hostility to secure the cooperation of the Reichswehr in reorganizing and modernizing the Red Army. The Soviet and German delegates to the economic conference at Genoa (the first international conference at which Soviet representatives appeared) had only to wind up the details of an agreement.

The treaty itself, reached at midnight in a hotel room at nearby Rapallo, was innocuous: the parties reestablished diplomatic relations, promised most-favored-nation treatment in trade, and, most important, mutually renounced claims—German claims for nationalized property in Russia, Russian claims for reparations under the Treaty of Versailles. Yet the announcement of the treaty shocked the world and infuriated the British and the French. Through it, the two defeated powers strengthened their positions, especially the Germans with regard to reparations and the Russians with regard to the acrid controversies over expropriated foreign holdings and repudiated bonds. It was a death blow for the Genoa economic conference. It threatened much more by its implications..

The fears were exaggerated. Weimar Germany did not become an ally of Russia; instead, she came to an understanding with the Western powers in the Locarno agreements, although German-Russian relations remained cordial until nearly a year after Adolf Hitler came to power. For a few years, Nazism and communism seemed the deadliest of enemies. But the world was shocked on August 23, 1939, by the ability of the two powers to turn from enmity to friendship. Negotiations had been going on for several months, and there had been feelers, mostly from the Soviet side, throughout most of the years of propagandistic hatred. Shortly after the agreement at Munich, in October, 1938, there was a Soviet-German understanding to refrain from attacks on the respective heads of state. Real movement toward agreement began in April, 1939, after the British guarantee to Poland; again, as at Rapallo, Germany looked east for help against the West. On August 19, there was a trade agreement under which Germany extended a credit of 200 million marks and agreed to furnish technical assistance. Still, the world was appalled when Nazi Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop was received with high honors in Moscow. There was reason for apprehension. The subsequent treaty, although outwardly only a nonaggression pact, included a secret agreement for the partitioning of Poland and much more of eastern Europe; and it was intended to open the way to the war, in which Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia were semi-allies until the fall of France relieved the Germans of the need for Russian cooperation.

The present situation bears little resemblance to that of 1922 or 1939. The Bonn Republic, with three-fourths of Germany's population, is neither a hard-pressed defeated nation nor a power rampaging toward territorial expansion, but is fully anchored, politically and economically, in the Western system. The Soviet Union is no weak and friendless outcast badly in need of German support, and there is no unoccupied land to be divided in eastern Europe. The German-Soviet

treaty, which now awaits a Berlin settlement before ratification, is even more harmless than Rapallo and the acknowledged Nazi-Soviet pact, as it amounts to little more than what the Russians call the "recognition of realities."

Yet the treaty signed by Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin and West German Chancellor Willy Brandt on August 12, 1970,\* has, like earlier German-Russian arrangements, aroused misgivings, not because of what it says but because of where it may conceivably lead. Reunification can hardly cease to be a German aspiration, but it is achievable only in agreement with the Russians, who would certainly exact a high price at the expense of the West. Even without reunification, diplomats wonder whether the Soviets may not somehow weaken German attachment to the democratic West. United States President Richard Nixon, in his foreign policy report to Congress, spoke of the dangers of a separate détente. Worry concerning German approaches to the Soviet Union contrasts with the calm with which much more far-reaching Franco-Soviet understandings have been received.

These fears arise from a sense of German unpredictability. Confidence in the democratic stability of the German Federal Republic has grown with its economic success, but the history of the past half century encourages no complacency that parliamentary consensus could resist German economic setbacks or severe divisions. The mentality which made possible the lurch from the democracy of the Weimar republic to Nazism cannot be assumed to have vanished in a generation during which German political life has been subject to much foreign, particularly American, influence. There seems to have been a bent for authoritarianism in German culture, for unqualified answers in philosophy and unquestioned authority in the family as in the state; moderation and empiricism have not been traditionally German.

The Rechtsstaat of the Second Reich was celebrated for its ethos of obedience. In the 1930's, most Germans accepted willingly, often passionately, a weirdly irrational political movement with an absurd and anti-

\* *Editor's note:* For the text of this treaty see *Current History*, October, 1970, pp. 238ff.

modern ideology, and the Nazi state operated with fearful efficiency. Nazism was more a cousin than an opposite of Bolshevism; some speculated in 1939–1940, as Hitler and Stalin worked together and as Russia considered joining the Axis, that brown and red totalitarianisms might fuse.<sup>1</sup>

Nowadays, East Germany has proved more efficient than any other Communist land. Despite such severe handicaps as the loss of one-tenth of her population (including many of her best trained and probably most intelligent personnel), large-scale reparations to the Soviet Union and some continued Soviet exploitation and the lack of legitimacy and national appeal of the Walter Ulbricht regime, East Germany has attained a standard of living well above that of the other satellites and the Soviets themselves.

At present, there is no group in Germany comparable to the rightists who in the 1920's and 1930's talked of National Bolshevism or were willing to overlook the Bolshevik ideology to find in Russia a partner for *realpolitik*. The Communist party is also incomparably weaker than it was in Weimar days. Yet there is a philosophic turbulence which may lead to extremism. Intellectual Germany has largely broken away from the American influence which stabilized the postwar decades. The United States has changed since 1965 from a model to an antimodel, as seen in, for example, the anti-Americanism (or "anti-imperialism") of *Spiegel*, West Germany's equivalent of *Time* plus *Newsweek*. This antagonism has owed much to United States involvement in Vietnam, and especially to failure there, for the Germans are prone to respect strength. Stress on American atrocities relieves the German conscience, the more so as the United States was held up as a paragon. The government is fully loyal to NATO, but anti-Americanism is the mood of students and intellectuals, who gladly take up America's self-incrimination as a racist, disorderly, exploitative and unjust society. At

the same time, the Germans have regained confidence in themselves through their economic power, exemplified by the upward valuation of the mark in 1969; nationalism has risen sharply. Germany is looking for a path to the future, and the answers of a decade ago are no longer satisfying.

## GERMAN MARXISM

For some, the path to the future is toward European union; much depends upon the progress which is made toward this goal, which Germany has embraced more strongly than any other major power. For others, the new age calls for radical social change in a Marxist direction. Marx and Engels were Germans and, until the Russian Revolution, Germany had the largest and best organized Marxist party in the world. A large sector of the German electorate remained Marxist until Hitler ended German political freedom. Postwar Germany turned away from Marxism because of American influence and in reaction to the implantation of a dictatorial regime in East Germany and the hardships inflicted on millions of Germans in East Europe—the expellees from the Sudetenland and the territories taken by Poland. But recently Marxism has gained more intellectual respectability than ever. It is the ideology of a majority of university youth and a large fraction of the professorate. Bookstores are filled with pink to red tracts, from works of Lenin or Mao to exposés of capitalism and imperialism in Latin America.

One reason for the upsurge of Marxism is the reaction to what is seen as the exaggerated and irrational American-fostered anti-communism of the cold war. It is part of anti-Americanism, the readiest explanation of what is seen as American imperialism in Vietnam. Germans were told that victory over communism in Southeast Asia was necessary for the security of Germany; many have come to believe that the chief danger to the peace comes from United States imperialism. Marxism is peculiarly useful because it offers a "class" explanation for Nazism; analyzing this movement as a manifestation of the decadence of capitalism, it divorces Nazism

<sup>1</sup> The affinities and interrelations of Nazism and Soviet Communism are discussed at length by Walter Laqueur, *Russia and Germany* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965).

from the German character and national past and relieves the Germans of any guilt.

As a reassertion of Germanism, Marxism is not regarded as subservience to the Soviet model. For German revolutionaries, the establishment of Communist power in Germany would mean not so much subordination to Russia as an opportunity to take the leadership in the world Communist movement—conceivably the way to German reunification and the restoration of German greatness. Non-Communist Germans take a certain pride in the advancement of the German Democratic Republic.

The revival of national feelings and the acceptability of Marxism combine with widespread German urges to a new orientation toward the East. The unimpressiveness of the Soviet Union's economic progress in recent years has helped to make it seem less threatening. It is widely urged that the Soviet Union can be no real threat and hence that American fears are selfishly motivated and have little to do with German security. Moral self-redemption indicates responsiveness toward the Soviet Union, in respect to which there are guilt feelings because of the ruthless German assault of 1941 and the tremendous destruction wrought—guilt feelings which increase as anti-communism is set aside.

There is also an urge to reopen communications with the half of Europe from which Germany was largely cut off in the cold war. For centuries, Germans have placed their hopes on the endless lands to the east, where they have enjoyed technical superiority, and vast space for the exercise of their talents and expansion of their trade if not of their dominion. For the crowded Federal Republic, with the population of the Weimar Republic crammed into half the area, the endless east, be it Czarist or Communist, has a romantic attraction; and Germany would like to knock at the door.

Germany has even more clearly occupied a special, at times dominant, place in the Russian view of the world. Germany has been not only the nearest but the most important nation of the Western world, representing at once the promise of Western

science and technology and the dangers of Western penetration, pacific or military. The old love-hate relation of Russia toward the West, admirable and productive yet haughty and dangerous, was especially intense in regard to Germany. The many Germans in Russia, valued for their education and bourgeois virtues and at the same time despised, formed a large part of the bureaucracy until near the end of czardom. After unification (1871), Germany became the only country capable of seriously threatening the Russian empire and so the chief problem for Russian foreign policy. At the same time, Germany was Russia's chief commercial partner, her educator, and in many ways her model. The reactionary Black Hundreds, the nationalistic Pan Slavists, and the revolutionary Social Democrats alike took ideas from German sources. Nowhere did Marx impress such a large proportion of the intellectuals as he did in Russia.

For the Bolsheviks, Germany was not only an intellectual home but their chief hope. Lenin justified his call for proletarian revolution in a relatively unindustrialized Russia in 1917 on the ground that the German workers were about to rise, and he did not expect to be able to retain power unless they did. "Who possesses Germany has Europe," he proclaimed; and he looked to an early transfer of the headquarters of world revolution to Berlin, whose proletariat was so much more numerous and better qualified than the Russian.

In the civil war, the Bolsheviks hoped for salvation from Germany, where they fomented revolution to the extent of their capacities. But their interest was not only in a revolutionary Germany. Lenin had special admiration for German efficiency and organization, which served more than anything in Marxian philosophy as a model for the bureaucratic organization of the Soviet state. Having insisted on a separate peace in March, 1918, a few months later Lenin proposed that German troops enter Russia to fight against the Allied intervention. In August, he concluded a treaty very favorable to the Germans, providing for a large indemnity; the



Russians kept on paying even after the Armistice in the West.<sup>2</sup>

Germany continued to be the focus of Soviet foreign policy, both official and communist-revolutionary, in the interwar period. German capitalists were seen as exploited victims of the hated Entente, and the Bolsheviks not only directed most of the efforts of the Comintern toward German revolution but cooperated with official Germany. The Red Army gave German officers access to forbidden weapons in return for training, and by 1932 half of Soviet foreign trade was with Germany. The friendship was ended by Hitler, not Stalin. The low point of relations came in 1936, when Hitler proclaimed the German need for *Lebensraum* in the Ukraine. Still, Stalin never seems to have given up hope for an accommodation, and relations began to improve in 1938 after the failure of policies of collective security with the Western democracies. After the 1939 pact, the Soviet Union collaborated with Germany economically, helping to thwart the blockade not only by selling its own goods but by facilitating transshipments, while German engineers contributed to Soviet industrialization. The Soviet Union eagerly imported German arms, and Communist parties everywhere denounced the war as the work of Anglo-French imperialists. After Molotov's unsuccessful visit to Berlin in October, 1940, he sought to continue negotiations on terms for joining the Axis; the Soviets were still interested as German preparations for the attack went forward.

### THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

As the war approached its end, Stalin was quicker than other Allied leaders to distinguish between Nazism and the German nation. But victory brought only partial success. After a brief period of calling for the unity of the occupied country in hopes of communizing it all, the Soviet Union fell back on incorporation of its zone into its political system. On October 13, 1949, Stalin hailed the proc-

lamation of the German Democratic Republic as a "turning-point in the history of Europe"; the long-awaited German revolution had at last come to at least part of the nation. In the next two decades, the G.D.R. was integrated more and more into the Soviet bloc, Comecon and the Warsaw Treaty Organization; it became the most important trading partner of the Soviet Union and lynchpin of the East European domain.

But the G.D.R. was the most insecure part of the Soviet sphere because its government lacked a national basis and it was the only Soviet satellite threatened from without, that is, by the Western call for reunification with free elections. Hence particular efforts were made to bind East Germany by means of political, cultural, economic and military ties to the Soviet Union. At the same time, her regime was defended by stressing to the utmost the virtues of "peace-loving," "socialist," and "progressive" Germany against "aggressive, reactionary" West Germany, allegedly enslaved to ex-Nazis and to German and American monopoly capital. The campaign to secure international recognition of the G.D.R. as a sovereign and legitimate state became the major theme of Soviet diplomacy with respect to Germany. Correspondingly, the Soviet Union did what it could to impede the integration of West Germany into NATO and to stop her rearmament, and it exerted constant pressure on the exposed position of Berlin. Although this policy did not prevent trade, and although West Germany became the Soviet Union's leading commercial partner outside the Soviet bloc, it excluded any friendly approach to the Federal Republic.

Soviet-German relations remained practically frozen in this pattern for 20 years, but both parties had reasons to look toward change. There was some thaw with the general movement toward détente after the Cuban crisis (October, 1962). After the retirement of German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer (October, 1963), German moves toward normalization of trade with East Europe were encouraged by relaxation within the Soviet sphere and by the Soviet Union's increased desire to trade with the West.

<sup>2</sup> Lionel Kochan, *Russia and the Weimar Republic* (London: Bowes and Bowes, 1954), pp. 12-13.

Shortly before his ouster (October, 1964), Khrushchev arranged to visit West Germany. The Leonid Brezhnev-Aleksei Kosygin leadership saw this as a betrayal of the G.D.R. and chilled the atmosphere; but the West German government (beginning in December, 1966) made greater efforts to open up relations with its eastern neighbors, moving away from the Hallstein Doctrine which forbade diplomatic relations with any country (except the Soviet Union) which recognized the German Democratic Republic. Efforts toward rapprochement with East Europe were truncated by the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia, an act excused largely in terms of preventing a German occupation of that country. East European countries of the Soviet sphere (excluding Rumania) were inhibited from diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic. Future dealings were to be carried on primarily through Moscow.

The more leftist Brandt government formed in October, 1968, took the indicated course of settling first with Moscow, with the familiar result of the treaty of August, 1970. This was followed by a treaty with Poland on December 7, accepting the German loss of the Oder-Neisse territories. The ratification of both treaties was made conditional, because of opposition within West Germany, on a satisfactory outcome of the negotiations over Berlin. The Federal Republic attributed enormous importance to these moves; the talks were reported and argued at great length, and for a long time they constituted the principal subject of political discussion in the media.

The Soviet Union made much less of them. Anti-German propaganda was dropped, but the Soviet public was told almost nothing of the negotiations; their completion on August 8 received only two inches in leading papers, with no hint as to the substance of the talks. Only on the day following the formal signing was much space given to the affair. But no explanation was given about how the formerly reviled Bonn Republic had become an acceptable treaty partner, and since then little has appeared in the Soviet press, either positive or negative, about West German policy,

as though the Soviet government were awaiting the outcome of the struggle (as it sees it) of German peace-loving forces for the ratification of the treaty against the revanchists. Indirectly, the Soviet Union has made clear the importance it attaches to relations with Germany. On December 2, heads of party and state of all Warsaw Pact countries, accompanied by many lesser officials, gathered in East Berlin to discuss the subject.

Both sides see much to gain in the treaty. By securing recognition of the borders of the G.D.R., the Soviet Union hopes to improve its status and security, and so to assure stability in Europe at a time when Soviet diplomacy is busy elsewhere, as in the Near East. The neutralization of Germany would mean the neutralization of Europe. A rapprochement could also open the way to more trade and technical borrowing, seemingly becoming more necessary for the Soviet Union if it is to maintain its economic standing.

Germans, having taken their first important independent diplomatic initiative since the war, seem glad to cross out an aspect of the regrettable past with surrogate peace treaties and look to a new start in relations with their eastern neighbors. They also welcome the prospect of increased commercial opportunities. For a time, there was much euphoric talk of building Soviet industry with German skills and capital, and astronomical credits were rumored. It is a measure of the change that eight years ago, at American instance, Bonn forbade the export of large-diameter pipe to Russia.

### CONFLICTING EXPECTATIONS

Relations between Federal Germany and the Soviet Union having been loosened, men on both sides have had reason to hope that they might move very far. Khrushchev and others have remarked that, historically, Russia and Germany have prospered when they have been friends. But moves toward friendship have run up against conflicting interests and practical difficulties. If, in 1970, men could envision great possibilities in the new German-Russian relations, this was because the two sides had opposite and contradictory

expectations. Seldom can a treaty have meant such contrary things for the contracting parties. For the Soviets it might be a means of loosening West Germany from the Western alliance, following the Leninist dictum of maneuvering to divide the enemy; more broadly, it should be a step toward separating Europe from the United States. For the Germans, it might help the alliance by removing the burden of Germany's special and unrealizable claims to the east, bringing German policy toward the Soviet Union into line with that of other Nato countries. For the Soviet Union, it is a means of hindering West European unity; for Germany, it should facilitate development of that union, in which Germany could more safely deal with Russia. For the Germans, the pact should be reason for Soviet guarantees for Berlin; the Soviets, who soon began saying that the order, first Berlin settlement and then ratification, should be reversed, seemed to take the opposite view. Regarding trade, the Soviets apparently felt that they should obtain economic advantages because of their political superiority, while the Germans hoped for political advantages from economic superiority.

The crucial contradiction is the Soviet hope that a warming of relations will soften the West and strengthen the East, whereas the Germans hope the reverse. For its purpose, the Soviet Union has sought to secure respectability for the Communist party in West Germany and to divide Brandt's Social Democrats from the Christian Democrats by favoring the former. In its sphere, Moscow sees the acceptance of the territorial status quo as reducing hopes for change and stabilizing Communist regimes, even as they profit from the injection of German capital and technology. The German motto is "*Wandel durch Annäherung*," "change by getting closer," the hope that friendly relations and multiplied contacts will hasten the modernization and liberalization of the Soviet sphere, ultimately making it possible to reunite divided Europe and divided Germany. Even intensified commercial relations have a dual

meaning in this sense. For the Germans they are a means of opening the closed societies; for the Soviets, they are a means of meeting production needs without having to loosen the politically bound planning system. At least in part, trade can be a substitute for economic liberalization.

It remains to be seen which calculations are more realistic, but it is clear that friendship with Federal Germany is politically doubtful for the Soviet Union. The Soviets have long held up that country as the major menace, and they have gone to great lengths to keep alive the memories of the war and fears of Nazism and German aggression to reinforce their rule both in East Europe and at home. A believable enemy is highly desirable if not indispensable in the Soviet ideological picture of the world, and a geographically close World War II foe fills this role much more convincingly than the United States, a distant ex-ally.

Undoubtedly some Soviet leaders have been loath to surrender the old devil, and for this reason the normally monolithic Soviet press has shown some confusion over *Ostpolitik*, which was at first associated with perfidious "bridge-building." Trade is useful, but the Soviet planned economy inclines to autarchy (Comecon countries had only 10 per cent of world trade in 1970, two-thirds of it among themselves), and the Soviet Union is not eager to increase very much its exchanges with the F.G.R. (which were only 4 per cent of Bonn's foreign trade in 1970, a proportion slightly less than the year before). By the end of 1970, Soviet authorities had cancelled several major contracts, turning from German to Japanese or Italian suppliers, and were delaying other projects; trade treaty negotiations have lagged.<sup>3</sup> It is of little help that Germany has a Social Democratic Chancellor. Ideology  
(Continued on page 304)

---

Robert G. Wesson has authored several books and articles on the Soviet Union and world affairs, most recently *Soviet Foreign Policy in Perspective* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1969). He has spent the academic year 1970-1971 in Berlin.

<sup>3</sup> *Der Spiegel*, No. 53, December 24, 1970, p. 29.

---

## CURRENT DOCUMENTS

---

# President Nixon on European Détente

*On February 25, 1971, in his second annual message to Congress on the State of the World, President Richard Nixon discussed United States policy toward a European détente. Excerpts from the section of his address that dealt with Europe follow:*

The cruel and unnatural division of Europe is no longer accepted as inevitable or permanent. Today there is a growing impatience with confrontation. We and our allies seek a European détente. But we know that we cannot achieve it if we let slip away the close friendships in the West and the basic conditions of stability which have set the stage for it. This obligates our allies and ourselves to conduct our diplomacy in harmony as we jointly and severally seek concrete negotiations on the range of issues in order to make détente a reality.

The economic strength of the NATO nations makes us considerably stronger in military potential than the Warsaw Pact.

The actual balance of conventional military forces in Europe is much closer, however. NATO's active forces in peacetime are roughly comparable to those of the Warsaw Pact. Following mobilization, NATO is capable of maintaining forces larger than the Warsaw Pact. But geographic proximity and differences in domestic systems give the Warsaw Pact the significant advantage of being able to mobilize its reserves and reinforce more rapidly than NATO.

The United States faced pressures to withdraw our forces from Western Europe for budgetary reasons and pressures to keep them there for purely symbolic reasons.

I decided, despite these pressures, that given a similar approach by our allies, the United States would maintain and improve its forces in Europe and not reduce them without reciprocal action by our adversaries.

In our view, détente means negotiating the concrete conditions of mutual security that will allow for expanded intra-European contact and cooperation without jeopardizing the security of any country. Soviet policies and doctrine, however, too often interpret détente in terms of Western ratification of the status quo and acknowledgement of continuing Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe. Beyond this, Soviet policy has been tempted to offer a relaxation of tension selectively to some allies but

not to others, and only on limited issues of primary interest to the U.S.S.R. In view of this fundamental difference, a major question for the alliance to face is whether we can overcome the East-West stalemate while maintaining unity among ourselves and avoiding internal divisions in our countries.

Obviously, the Western countries do not have identical national concerns and cannot be expected to agree automatically on priorities or solutions. Each ally is the best judge of its own national interest. But our principal objective should be to harmonize our policies and insure that our efforts for détente are complementary. A differentiated détente, limited to the U.S.S.R. and certain Western allies but not others, would be illusory.

The U.S.S.R. has frequently proposed a general conference on European security. But such a conference, in the Soviet formulation, would not address the main security issues—the German question, Berlin, mutual force reductions—but only very general themes. We and our allies are prepared to negotiate with the East in any forum. But we see little value in a conference whose agenda would be unlikely to yield progress on concrete issues but would only deflect our energies to drafting statements and declarations the interpretation of which would inevitably be a continuing source of disagreements. Once a political basis for improving relations is created through specific negotiations already in process, a general conference might build on it to discuss other intra-European issues and forms of cooperation.

Any lasting relaxation of tension in Europe must include progress in resolving the issues related to the division of Germany.

The reshaping of German relations with the East . . . affects the interests of all European states.

Therefore, there has been full consultation within the alliance during the evolution of the Federal Republic's new policies and the negotiation of its new treaties with the U.S.S.R. and Poland. It is clearly established that allied responsibilities and rights are not affected by the terms of these treaties.

---

---

## BOOK REVIEWS

---

---

### ON EAST EUROPE

#### TWENTIETH CENTURY RUMANIA.

BY STEPHEN FISCHER-GALATI. (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1970. 224 pages, bibliographical notes, index, \$7.95.)

#### BULGARIA UNDER COMMUNIST

RULE. BY J. F. BROWN. (New York, Washington, London: Praeger Publishers, 1970. 305 pages, appendixes, bibliography, index, \$11.00.)

#### CONTEMPORARY YUGOSLAVIA:

TWENTY YEARS OF SOCIALIST EXPERIMENT. EDITED BY WAYNE S. VUCINICH. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969. 350 pages, index, \$9.50.)

Although these three volumes are grouped together for review purposes, each represents a rather different approach to its task—the developmental description of a given national entity. Fischer Galati's book is a panoramic survey of Rumania's development over the past six decades. Its central theme is the pursuit—through a variety of vicissitudes—of what the author calls Rumania's "national legacy." By this he means the nineteenth century Rumanian drive towards national autonomy and power, resting on rather dubious historical connections with much earlier "Rumanian" political entities. Galati concludes that under the present Nicolae Ceausescu government, Rumania has to an important degree realized her people's dream of unity and power, albeit without much popular control.

Brown's book, by contrast, has a considerably narrower focus—even narrower than the title indicates—and reaches rather different conclusions with regard to the legitimacy of Bulgarian communism. Although he begins with several background chapters on the Stalinist era, Brown is

chiefly interested in the post-Stalin era and in the question: why has Bulgaria remained so Stalinist for such a long time? Through a series of excellent and detailed studies of industrial and agricultural policy, education, foreign relations and party life, he lays bare the timidity and lack of imagination that characterized the post-Stalin leadership in Bulgaria, and explain to a marked degree that nation's quiescence and stagnation.

The third book is the outcome of a conference on Yugoslavia held at Stanford University in late 1965. As such, it naturally lacks the unity and direction of the other two books. There are seven contributors, all established scholars who have elsewhere written well and widely about Yugoslavia. Their purpose here appears to be to provide a historical survey and a treatment of such current topics as modernization and ethnic diversity, foreign policy and Marxist ideology. Although some of the essays are dated, this is a useful book for a reader seeking a general introduction to the Yugoslav experiment.

Stephen S. Anderson  
Windham College

#### POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION.

EDITED BY R. BARRY FARRELL. (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1970. 384 pages, name and subject indexes, \$10.00.)

The 1968 conference which produced this book was held under the auspices of Northwestern University's Comparative Politics Program to pool existing knowledge about the behavior and evolution of political leadership in the U.S.S.R. and East Europe, and to discuss the methodologies most appropriate to further study. While some of the latter purpose is reflected in the book, it is primarily the former on which its 15 contributors focus. Their essays are



loosely organized into three categories: theorizing about leadership in a Communist (i.e. programmatic, single-party) setting; characteristic problems and trends within given leaderships; and relations between leaderships and their societies. It is in the third category that some of the volume's most interesting essays are found, for example, H. Gordon Skilling's "Leadership and Group Conflict in Czechoslovakia."

On the whole, this is a ponderous book, representing a great variety of viewpoints and approaches—including three East European contributions—and written more for the specialist than the layman. Its concentration on the problem of leadership and, even more specifically, the adequacy of the Communist modes of leadership, gives it more coherence than many more general anthologies. S.S.A.

**SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE: A GUIDE TO BASIC PUBLICATIONS.** BY PAUL L. HORECKY, EDITOR. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969. 641 pages and index, \$25.00.)

**EAST CENTRAL EUROPE: A GUIDE TO BASIC PUBLICATIONS.** BY PAUL L. HORECKY, EDITOR. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969. 812 pages and index, \$35.00.)

These two volumes provide the best general bibliography of East Europe currently available in English. The first covers Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Rumania and Yugoslavia; the second treats Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary and Poland. The Soviet Union is not included in either, having been dealt with exhaustively in an earlier effort by Professor Horecky, *Russia and the Soviet Union: A Bibliographic Guide to Western-Language Publications* (1965). Both volumes begin with an overview section which lists works treating the region as a whole under a variety of topics: history, geography, the nationality question, and so on. Following this are sections focussing on individual countries, with further subdivisions. Well over 100

recognized scholars collaborated in the preparation of the two books, each taking responsibility for one or more of the topical subdivisions. Included are books and outstanding articles, as well as key periodicals in both indigenous and Western languages—primarily English. It should be noted that this is an annotated bibliography, with a brief descriptive paragraph following each entry. The result of Professor Horecky's careful editorship is an extremely serviceable set of research tools, which should be in the reference section of any library concerned with European and Communist world affairs. S.S.A.

---

### EAST AND WEST EUROPE (Continued from page 262)

mains that for the past 25 years the two areas of Europe have been developing differently and, if anything, growing farther apart. When, in addition, one considers the recent proliferation of mini-states, the strong revival of nationalism and the emergence of racial and ethnic conflicts throughout the world, there is little reason to believe that in the case of Europe all these will be submerged in the name of "unity," however broadly defined.

Thus at the present time the chances of bringing the two Europes closer together do not appear very bright. If Europe is to be "united" again, the process is likely to take a very long time. Above all, it must be strongly supported by all the interested parties. Failing this, there is really no "alternative to partition," and Europe will continue to be divided indefinitely.

---

### GERMAN POLICY TOWARD EAST EUROPE (Continued from page 301)

logically, the Social Democrats, disguised servants of capitalism, are more dangerous than outright capitalists; the party more friendly to the Soviets is the party more dangerous for their system. It may be that a Communist Germany would be most dangerous of all to the Russian position.

Soviet fears pertain mostly to the East European sphere of influence. The alleged German danger has been the prime excuse for

Soviet protection of that region and for uncompromising regimes in various satellites. Events in Poland at the end of 1970 and the beginning of 1971 indicated danger in détente. Polish Premier Wladyslaw Gomulka saw the recognition by the principal German state of Poland's ownership of the Oder-Neisse territories as a triumph strengthening his regime.

But the workers did not seem to have been so impressed. Only a few days later strikes and riots broke out in the port cities in protest against raised prices of foodstuffs, and it was harder in view of the treaty to repress them as machinations of the imperialists.

The area where rapprochement with West Germany is most dangerous for Soviet power is East Germany. The Ulbricht government, which as late as 1967 was raising the specter of an armed attack by the F.G.R. on its state, has been at all times the most reluctant to accept any rapprochement, and its general policy in the face of improved West German-Soviet relations has been to sharpen the division between the two Germanies, emphasizing the "imperialist" character of the one and the "socialism" of the other. The existence of "Germany" as a single nation is denied; remaining coins with the inscription "Deutschland" are replaced by those with "*Deutsche Demokratische Republik*"; imports marked "Made in Germany" are turned back. The importance of a stable East Germany for the Soviet Union makes it impossible for the Soviets to do anything which would seriously undercut the Ulbricht policies. For East and West Germany to come to a real understanding would be equally threatening for the Soviet bloc.

The *Ostpolitik* thus offers West Germany hopes of an entree to East Europe which the Soviet Union least desires and which is a price it cannot pay for any admissible volume of trade. Germany hopes to recover by a friendly approach something of what was lost by defeat, at least part of her historic influence in the neighboring lands. *Ostpolitik* is thus not entirely separable from *Drang nach Osten*; and it may come to represent a new, pacific and civilized phase of the old contest between Russia and Germany for domination of the

lands between. It has never been possible to draw an acceptable demarcation between their spheres, as first one and then the other has pressed forward. Despite ideological affinities, czarist Russia and the Kaiser's Germany fell apart over conflicting interests in the Balkans. In the 1920's a common adversary stood between them and helped cement friendships despite ideological antipathy. The friendship of Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia broke down because Stalin asserted interests in conflict with Germany from Finland to the Straits.

Now Germany finds it difficult to resign herself to exclusion from East Europe. The United States can dissociate itself from any real interest in that area, but it must be a permanent preoccupation of German foreign policy to secure access and eventually at least parity of influence in the countries now tied into the Soviet bloc.

Most of all, the Federal Republic is permanently concerned with the division of Germany. It is not so much that the eastern region should have a separate government. Disunion was tolerable before 1870, and the present separation of Germanic Austria is taken for granted. It is rather because of the kind of division symbolized by the Wall, a barrier much higher than ordinary national boundaries. Part of the German nation has been artificially made more foreign in practical ways than Japan.

A close association of Germany and Russia offers great potentialities for both sides and it is an attractive aspiration. But it is difficult to see how the dreams can be realized even with good will on both sides. The two powers have much to offer one another, but they are natural antagonists and competitors. Germany remains the land posing the greatest threat to the Soviet position in East Europe and she becomes not less but more of a threat if she is friendly and "progressive," while the Soviet Union bars a dynamic and highly industrialized land not only from influence over her hinterland but from reunification. *Ostpolitik* looks like a new name for the old duel between Russia and Germany carried on at a more civilized and less violent level.

## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

*(Continued from page 289)*

During the eight post-invasion months that Dubcek remained in office, he tried to salvage as much as possible of his reform program. Unlike some of his former close associates, he did not try to escape responsibility. When his personal fate became a boomerang between the two factions of the party and when, before his disappearance from public life, he was shifted to various short-term assignments and exposed to party investigations of his reformist activities, he declined to perform the dismal ritual of self-criticism. Whatever difference of opinion may exist about Dubcek's role in the recent troubled years of Czechoslovakia's history, his position in the nation's Hall of Fame is indisputable. To his countrymen, he became a symbol of a national dream which he nearly made a reality.

For Czechoslovakians who were born after World War I and who reached maturity when Masaryk's Czechoslovakia was disappearing, the eight months of the Prague Spring were their only taste of freedom's honey. In the defense of their gains on the way toward free-

<sup>7</sup> In his message to the Congress, December 6, 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt formulated this principle in the following words which later became known as the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, quoted from *Documents of American History*, Vol. II, p. 213, edited by Henry Steel Commager (New York: P. S. Crofts, 1969):

If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power. . . .

<sup>8</sup> In one important aspect the military interventions were different: the United States never extended such police actions into permanent occupation.

dom, Dubcek rallied his countrymen to a superb show of national unity.

## THE NATION'S PROSPECT

Although the short-term outlook for change in Czechoslovakia is bleak, the long-term outlook is not so hopeless. It is true that with the help of its Brezhnev Doctrine the Soviet Union can now "legally" crush any undesirable reform attempts in the households of her bloc partners. Yet, as Talleyrand said, one can accomplish a great deal with bayonets except to sit on them. This is what the Soviet Union is now doing in Czechoslovakia and in other parts of East Europe in order to hold the satellite bloc together. The Soviet Union cannot stay in this uncomfortable position forever.

Two alternative developments seem possible. The Soviet Union may some day be forced to direct its attention to and apply its military power in another troublesome area along its long southern border in Asia. In such a situation, two or more of its European bloc partners might seize the opportunity to decline obedience. (So far the Soviet Union has never needed to "normalize" more than one recalcitrant satellite at a time.) Such a situation would probably spark an explosion in the whole bloc. Czechs and Slovaks could then recover their freedom either within the framework of their former republic or within the framework of some broader Central or all-European federation. This latter solution would offer them more security in the future and would therefore be more practical even if it would not restore a full sovereignty which, for the small nations of Europe, has proved to be of elusive value in the twentieth century.

The other possibility is a change in the Soviet Union itself. An analogy from the history of the Western Hemisphere can offer some support to theorizing in this direction. After the Spanish-American War, the United States under President Theodore Roosevelt claimed, as the Soviet Union claims today, a unilateral right of intervention within its zone of interest.<sup>7</sup> Like the Soviet Union west of its border, so the United States<sup>8</sup> south of its

border called on this claimed right repeatedly. Franklin D. Roosevelt modified this "Big Stick" interpretation of the century-old Monroe Doctrine and replaced it by his "Good Neighbor Policy" in the 1930's.

One may wonder whether this is not a behavior pattern typical of a newly born world power: in order to gain prestige and recognition, the new giant likes to show and occasionally use his newly acquired big stick. But once he reaches maturity and gains self-confidence, he finds that friendly neighborly relations may better serve his interests. Should this be a typical pattern, the Soviet Union may, perhaps, some day discard its un-Marxian fear of change, stop persecuting its intellectuals, humanize its domestic institutions and, as *primus inter pares*, refine its relations with its neighbors. If the Soviet Union undergoes such a civilizing process, its East European commonwealth might become an acceptable security framework within which the Czechs and Slovaks and, possibly, other satellites might find a satisfactory accommodation for their national aspirations.

Such a process will necessarily of course take time. A similar process on this continent lasted 30 years—between the two Roosevelt administrations. This is a long time in the life of an individual, but a relatively short period in the life of a nation, especially one which survived 300 years of repressive Hapsburg rule.

---

## THE UNITED STATES AND EAST EUROPE

(Continued from page 268)

increasingly difficult to gauge the motives of many actions of the United States in Europe. A credibility gap has been created. For example, should the détente be understood as a mutual relaxation of tensions between the major states and the divided parts of Europe? Or is it to mean something more than that, e.g., a vehicle for the promotion of a European settlement?

Proposals that concentrate on deescalating the cost of United States commitments in Europe without bringing into question the

nature of the various alternative kinds of relationship run the risk of sanctifying the continued division of Europe. If West Europe's security, for example, continues to devolve operationally on NATO, any questions about the importance of that organization in a low-threat environment constitute a clear and present danger. At the same time, inasmuch as false détente atmospheres in the recent past have tended to raise pressures in Congress for reducing the level of our forces in Europe, it may well be that a post-Vietnam détente will lead to such reductions.

The challenge to United States foreign policy is clear. It is not enough for the United States to restrict its efforts toward European reconciliation to benign forms of competition, or to await the de facto emergence of some new European order to facilitate the proper climate for negotiations. In either event, it stands to lose all chance of shaping those developments to its advantage. For this reason it is preferable to try to reach a general European settlement now while the United States can yet shape its course. The United States could do the East Europeans no greater service than effectively to engage the Soviet Union in hard discussions on the future disposition of Europe.

It may be argued that by pursuing a comprehensive and serious effort to reach a general European settlement involving the inevitable rigors and dangers of intra-alliance negotiation, the Soviet capacity to exploit differences that might arise within the Atlantic Alliance would be considerably heightened. Yet the possibility of failure should not be permitted to prejudice the opportunity for success. Whatever hardships were involved in switching over to a new policy for East Europe, in all likelihood they would not be any more obdurate than the present ineffectiveness that characterizes United States-East European relations. The real crisis of United States relations with East Europe is nothing less than a crisis of confidence in United States intentions, in the quality of its statesmanship and in its ability to take the lead in resolving the increasingly distressing dilemmas of its European policy.



## HUNGARY

*(Continued from page 294)*

Code of 1967 has not lived up to the regime's expectations. The new code gave trade unions the task of representing and protecting the rights and interests of their members, and as such was a path-breaking attempt to allow interest-group activity. The Labor Code, *inter alia*, provided for the "right to object": "The trade union body within the enterprise has the right to object to any action by the enterprise which infringes on the regulations relating to employment, or to behavior which offends against socialist morality."

According to the code, if a trade union uses its "right to object" on a particular issue, management (unless it decides to agree with the objection) must (a) suspend the activity to which the union objects and (b) put its own case and the union's case before a tribunal or higher state agency which, in turn, will arbitrate the differences. Partly because of timidity, partly because of official appeals that the unions refrain from "misusing" their newly won rights, explicit application of the "right to object" has not been particularly extensive. On the other hand, its implicit application—that is, as a deterrent to management—through the use of threats or warnings may possibly accomplish the code's professed objective.

In sum, while the innovative New Economic Mechanism has brought Hungary to the threshold of modernity, the implementation of political reform has run into apathy and timidity. Despite apparently sincere official desire for broader participation and despite the availability of appropriate institutions, it is widely assumed that the party will work its will regardless of any intervening action by the general public or special interest

groups. So far, the Kádár regime has not pushed its political reform with the same vigor and determination as it has promoted the New Economic Mechanism. While it has taken considerable risks in the reform of economic management—particularly in terms of decentralization and a relaxed pricing mechanism—it has pursued the objectives of political reform with great circumspection.

In the political realm, then, the results are mixed. The style of leadership has dramatically improved with the new emphasis on persuasion. The widespread fear of an earlier era, symbolized by the midnight knock on the door, has disappeared; the public expression of divergent views is tolerated; in some cases it is encouraged. On the other hand, the institutional representation of group interests has not yet become an integral part of the Hungarian political system.

Whenever the Kádár regime seeks change, it must keep in mind both the internal needs of the country and the international environment in which it operates. The key to that environment remains the Soviet Union, and for this reason Hungary has carefully avoided alienating or even embarrassing its powerful eastern neighbor. For this reason, too, Hungarian foreign policy lacks the dramatic flavor of Rumanian foreign policy; the Kádár regime does not, and will not, deviate from the general direction of Soviet foreign policy. As a result, Kádár enjoys the confidence and trust of the Soviet leadership, while concurrently he enjoys the support of his countrymen. Only 15 years ago most Hungarians thought of him as a traitor; today they take pride in his realism and sophistication.

In the 1970's, the Kádár regime's dilemma will continue to be how to maintain power in a small country in view of the limits of independence in East Europe. Hungary's leaders remember the Soviet intervention in 1956 and the fate of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and under no circumstances do they wish to invite trouble and tragedy. With sagacity and a keen sense of history and geography, they pursue the politics of compromise, steering as best they know how, trying to reconcile the desirable with the possible.

*Erratum:* We regret that an error appeared in a map credit in our March, 1971, issue. The source of the map on Population Pressure in Africa is *Population Migration and Urbanization in Africa*, by William Hance (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970). The map was reprinted by permission of Columbia University Press.



---

# THE MONTH IN REVIEW

---

*A CURRENT HISTORY chronology covering the most important events of March, 1971, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.*

## INTERNATIONAL

### Berlin Crisis

(See also *Germany*)

Mar. 3—In retaliation for East German harassment on access roads linking West Berlin to West Germany, the U.S., Britain and France cancel a meeting scheduled for tomorrow with the Soviet Union.

Mar. 6—Formal negotiations between the West Berlin City administration and the East German government begin on the subject of Easter passes; passes were last issued to West Berliners in 1966.

### Disarmament

Mar. 2—At the 25-nation disarmament conference in Geneva, Japan and Sweden urge the U.S. and the Soviet Union to limit the destructiveness of and not merely the number of their strategic nuclear missiles.

Mar. 15—The 4th round of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) opens in Vienna between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

Mar. 30—The Soviet delegation presents a draft agreement to the Geneva Conference that calls for a ban on biological weapons; this is the first time the U.S.S.R. has agreed to a ban on biological weapons that did not include chemical weapons also.

### European Economic Community (Common Market)

Mar. 1—The foreign ministers of the 6 Common Market countries, meeting in Brussels, agree to give Britain an adjustment period of 4½ years to allow Britain to bring her farm prices up to the level of the Six if she should join the E.E.C.

Mar. 6—The European Development Fund of the Common Market announces that it has allocated a grant of \$46 million to aid

African countries associated with the E.E.C.

Mar. 23—80,000 farmers from the 6 Common Market countries stage a demonstration in Brussels demanding increased prices for their produce; one person is killed and 140 injured in the demonstrations which were called to coincide with a meeting of the agriculture ministers of the member countries.

Mar. 25—Common Market ministers meeting in Brussels agree to increase farm prices by an average of 4 per cent and to a \$1.48-billion modernization program.

Mar. 30—Meeting in Brussels, the foreign ministers of the Common Market countries agree to allow duty-free entry of manufactured and semi-manufactured goods to their countries from developing nations, beginning July 1, 1971.

### Middle East

(See also *Israel*)

Mar. 7—U.A.R. President Anwar el-Sadat declares that he will not extend the cease-fire with Israel along the Suez Canal; the cease-fire expires today. Sadat says that the U.A.R. will continue diplomatic efforts to reach a Middle East settlement.

In a statement, Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban declares that Israel will not fire unless fired upon, that Israel is now waiting for replies from the U.A.R. to Israeli offers for detailed negotiations and that Israel will not agree to total withdrawal to the pre-June, 1967, borders.

Mar. 10—The Israeli Embassy in Washington issues a policy paper saying that Israel will "resist all pressures" aimed at "resurrecting Israel's past territorial vulnerability," and that "Israel has the right to maintain with its own forces the security of

Sharm el Sheik, its only link with East Africa and Asia."

Mar. 11—Israeli and U.A.R. delegates meet separately with Gunnar Jarring, U.N. Secretary General U Thant's special representative for the Middle East.

Mar. 12—In an interview, Israeli Premier Golda Meir outlines the Israeli position on a Middle East settlement; included in the proposals are: Israeli possession of Sharm el Sheik at the southernmost tip of the Sinai Peninsula; demilitarization of the Sinai; and the retention of Jerusalem by Israel.

Mar. 17—Israeli Premier Meir rejects U. S. Secretary of State William Rogers' proposals for an international peacekeeping force to maintain Israel's security as part of a Middle East settlement.

Mar. 19—Speaking at a news conference after meeting separately with Rogers and U.S. President Richard Nixon's adviser on national security affairs, Henry Kissinger, Eban says that Israel will not withdraw to the boundaries that existed before the June, 1967, war.

The U.A.R. reports that 2 Israeli Phantom fighter-bombers intruded into U.A.R. air space today near the northern end of the Suez Canal and were challenged by anti-aircraft defenses.

Mar. 29—The official Egyptian Middle East News Agency reports that permission has been granted to the "Voice of Assifa," a Palestinian radio program, to resume its broadcasts; a ban was imposed on July 28, 1970, shortly before the August 7, 1970, Middle East cease-fire went into effect.

## United Nations

Mar. 2—Lane Pathammavong, the chargé d'affaires of the Laotian Embassy in Washington, calls on U.N. Secretary General Thant to protest the presence of foreign troops in Laos.

Mar. 5—In a report to the Security Council, Secretary General Thant calls on Israel to respond favorably to Gunnar Jarring's request that Israel commit herself to withdraw her forces from Arab territory.

Mar. 22—Secretary General Thant calls for isolation of South Africa and for efforts to disrupt her economy because of South Africa's racial policies.

## War in Indochina

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Mar. 2—The Cambodian command reports that Vietcong forces attacked Cambodia's only oil refinery at Kompong Som today.

Mar. 3—More South Vietnamese troops cross the border into Laos.

7 U.S. helicopters are destroyed while supporting the South Vietnamese drive in Laos.

The U.S. command reports that North Vietnamese gunners have fired anti-aircraft missiles across the demilitarized zone at U.S. planes flying over South Vietnam.

Mar. 4—To protest U.S. bombing of North Vietnam, Vietcong and North Vietnamese chief delegates to the Paris peace talks fail to attend a session; their deputies appear.

Mar. 5—Military spokesmen in Quangtri, South Vietnam, report that South Vietnamese forces, which have been stalled 16 miles inside Laos for 2 weeks, are being flown by U.S. helicopters 7 to 9 miles deeper into Laos.

Mar. 6—South Vietnamese troops move into Tchepone, Laos, in the continuing drive against enemy supply lines. Tchepone, a major link in the supply route, has been under heavy U.S. air attack.

Mar. 7—More than 1,000 U.S. planes take part in raids against enemy forces in Laos and Cambodia.

Mar. 8—The U.S. military command reports the reduction of U.S. troop strength in South Vietnam by about 4,000 men last week. The number of U.S. servicemen in Vietnam is placed at 322,200; this is the lowest level since October, 1966.

Mar. 10—The U.S. command reports that attacking U.S. fighter-bombers set off 1,600 explosions of enemy fuel and ammunition supplies in Laos yesterday.

Mar. 11—Heavy fog cuts down U.S. air support for South Vietnamese troops fighting in Laos.

Mar. 13—South Vietnamese staff officers say that their troops in the Tchepone area have completed their mission and have pulled back.

According to informed sources, the Indian delegation has asked Canada and Poland, the other members of the International Control Commission on Laos, to join with India in a 4-point peace appeal.

Mar. 16—U.S. spokesmen report that the allied base at Khesanh, South Vietnam, came under heavy attack yesterday.

Heavy fighting between Cambodian and enemy forces is reported in an area 13 miles northeast of Pnompenh, Cambodia.

Mar. 18—Spokesmen in Saigon report that some South Vietnamese forces in Laos are moving back toward the border with South Vietnam as heavy fighting continues.

The U.S. command reports that SAM missiles were fired from sites in North Vietnam at U.S. B-52's flying over Laos.

North Vietnamese and Vietcong chief delegates continue to boycott the Paris peace talks.

Mar. 20—U.S. helicopters fly South Vietnamese troops out of Laos as the South Vietnamese retreat from 2 bases.

The South Vietnamese command announces that 2,000-3,000 of its troops in Laos have been withdrawn; the command says the North Vietnamese supply trail network has been sufficiently disrupted. The Laotian campaign, originally planned to continue into May, ended early, reportedly because of the intensity of enemy resistance.

Mar. 22—Heavy fighting is reported at points ranging from 1½ to 5 miles from the royal capital at Luang Prabang, Laos; rockets are fired at the airfield, used as a base for Laotian air force fighter-bombers.

U.S. fighters and bombers attack missile sites inside North Vietnam for the 2d consecutive day.

Mar. 23—Retreating from Laos, a South Vietnamese armored force fights its way home and reaches South Vietnam. *The New York Times* reports that the large allied base at Khesanh in the northwest

corner of South Vietnam is being dismantled.

Mar. 25—2,000 South Vietnamese troops leave their last base in Laos, ending the operation that began 44 days ago; 500 marines remain in Laos about 2 miles from the border to help in the defense of Khesanh.

Mar. 27—U.S. forces in South Vietnam, near the Laotian border, come under heavy rocket and mortar attack.

Mar. 28—A U.S. artillery base in the northern part of the Central Highlands of South Vietnam is attacked and partly overrun by enemy forces.

## ARGENTINA

Mar. 18—In the face of a strike called by the outlawed General Labor Confederation in Córdoba, the government declares the area an emergency zone; an army commander takes charge of the city.

Mar. 19—In a televised press conference, President Roberto Marcelo Levingston announces that he has dismissed the chairman of the Argentine joint chiefs of staff for "a disciplinary infraction."

Mar. 22—President Levingston dismisses Lieutenant General Alejandro Agustín Lanusse, the commander in chief of Argentina's armed forces.

Mar. 23—Lanusse, Admiral Pedro Alberto José Gnavi, naval chief, and Brigadier General Carlos Alberto Rey, air force commander, depose Levingston as President and assume control of the government in the name of the armed forces.

Mar. 24—Acting in the name of the military junta, General Lanusse announces the removal of the ceiling on wages.

Mar. 26—Lanusse is sworn in as President and swears in the new members of his Cabinet.

## AUSTRALIA

Mar. 10—Prime Minister John G. Gorton fails to win a vote of confidence on his party leadership by Liberal party members of Parliament. William McMahon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, is elected as the new

leader of the Liberal party and therefore the new Prime Minister.

McMahon is sworn in as the Prime Minister.

### CANADA

Mar. 13—Paul Rose is convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment for his part in the kidnapping and slaying of Pierre Laporte, Quebec's Minister of Labor and Immigration, by members of the Front for the Liberation of Quebec in October, 1970.

### CHILE

Mar. 25—A North Vietnamese commercial mission opens in Chile.

### CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (Communist)

Mar. 8—Swiss authorities announce that Sun Chi-Chou, a Nationalist Chinese diplomat, has defected to Communist China by presenting himself to the Communist Chinese Embassy in Berne.

Mar. 10—*Hsinhua*, the Chinese press agency, releases a joint communiqué signed by Premier Chou En-lai and North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong calling for new cooperation between the 2 countries and pledging Chinese support in the "war against United States aggression. . . ."

Mar. 16—*Hsinhua* announces the launching of the 2d Communist Chinese earth satellite on March 3.

Mar. 17—*Hsinhua* transmits an editorial charging that the Soviet Union uses the restored bourgeoisie to suppress the working class, uses armed forces and police to suppress people of different nationalities in the U.S.S.R., stations troops in Eastern Europe to impose control over the people, and engages in military expansion.

### ECUADOR

Mar. 31—Following his ouster as head of the War Academy yesterday, General Luis Jácome Chávez leads a military revolt against President José Maria Velasco Ibarra; the rebels are demanding the dis-

missal of the Defense Minister and the army commander.

### FINLAND

Mar. 17—Premier Ahti K. Karjalainen presents the resignation of his 5-party coalition Cabinet to President Urho Kekkonen; the Cabinet split over the lifting of price controls on 15 items.

### FRANCE

Mar. 9—Fighting breaks out between riot police in Paris and left-wing students who had been fighting right-wing groups; about 80 policemen are injured.

Mar. 15—French officials announce that an arrangement has been concluded with the Soviet Union under which the Soviet Union has agreed to enrich natural uranium supplied by France for eventual French use; France has been dependent on the U.S. for her enriched uranium.

Mar. 16—Air France and 2 other French airlines reach an agreement with union negotiators; flights are scheduled to resume tomorrow.

### GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

Mar. 14—In elections for West Berlin's Parliament, Chancellor Willy Brandt's Social Democratic party receives 50.4 per cent of the vote; this is 6.5 per cent less than in the last election 4 years ago. The Social Democrats win 70 seats in the 133-member Parliament; the Christian Democrats, 52 seats; and the Free Democrats, 11 seats.

### GREECE

Mar. 17—Under Secretary George Georgalas announces that 2 political prison camps on Leros island will be closed next month; 60 or 70 prisoners held since the 1967 coup d'état will be sent to live in "enforced residence."

### HONDURAS

Mar. 29—On the basis of almost complete returns, Ramon Ernesto Cruz is declared President of Honduras for the next 6 years.

## INDIA

- Mar. 7—9 persons are killed in West Bengal; 55 persons have been killed in India because of disruptions since the start of national parliamentary elections on March 1.
- Mar. 12—With 90 per cent of the results in for the 521 seats in the lower house of Parliament, it is reported that Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's New Congress party has won 327 seats.
- Mar. 17—The 440 New Congress members of Parliament unanimously reelect Prime Minister Indira Gandhi as their leader.
- Mar. 18—Prime Minister Gandhi's new Cabinet is sworn in.
- Mar. 31—Parliament passes a resolution accusing the government of Pakistan of the massacre of the people of East Pakistan and assuring East Pakistan of India's support.

## IRAQ

- Mar. 30—Former Iraqi Vice President Hardan Takriti is assassinated in Kuwait.

## ISRAEL

(See also *Intl, Middle East*)

- Mar. 16—Following a walkout by opposition members of Parliament, a motion of no confidence is defeated; the motion for a vote of no confidence was proposed to challenge the terms Premier Golda Meir laid down during a newspaper interview for an eventual peace settlement with the Arabs.

## ITALY

- Mar. 17—The Constitutional High Court publishes a decision declaring unconstitutional a ban on the dissemination of birth control information.
- Mar. 20—A 4th leader of the National Front movement, an ultra-rightist group, is arrested; police continue to search for leaders of the group which was said to be involved in an abortive neo-Fascist coup against the government.
- Mar. 25—Yugoslav President Tito begins an official visit.
- Mar. 27—U.A.R. Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad confers with Premier Emilio Colombo

and Foreign Minister Aldo Moro in Rome and later flies to Pisa to see Tito.

## JAPAN

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

- Mar. 1—The Kyodo News Agency reports that Communist Chinese Premier Chou En-lai and Kaheita Okazaki, a Japanese negotiator, have signed a joint communiqué in Peking renewing a trade agreement for one year.
- Mar. 12—The Japanese textile industry says that it will proceed with the plan for restrictions on voluntary textile exports to the U.S.
- Mar. 21—*Akahata*, the Japanese Communist party newspaper, announces that the party has agreed to send a delegation to the 24th Soviet Communist Party Congress which is to open on March 30.

## JORDAN

(See also *Kuwait*)

- Mar. 28—After 2 days of fighting in the northern city of Irbid between government forces and Palestinian guerrillas, fighting breaks out in Amman. Government forces regain control of the city.
- Mar. 31—The U.A.R. Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and King Hussein issue separate appeals for a meeting of Arab heads of state to end renewed fighting in Jordan between Palestinian commandos and Jordanian troops.

## KOREA, REPUBLIC OF (South)

- Mar. 12—A Defense Ministry spokesman announces that South Korean troops have completely replaced U.S. troops along the armistice border.

## KUWAIT

- Mar. 4—According to *The New York Times*, Sheik Sabah al-Salem al-Sabah, Ruler of Kuwait, has issued instructions to his government to resume annual subsidy payments to Jordan.

## LAOS

(See *Intl, War in Indochina*)



**LIBYA**

Mar. 19—Western oil companies present a revised offer to the Libyan Oil Minister in negotiations over Libya's demands for increased oil revenues.

**MALAYSIA**

Mar. 3—The Malaysian Parliament passes a constitutional amendment which would curb free speech even among members of Parliament on such sensitive issues as race.

**MEXICO**

Mar. 15—In a news conference, Prosecutor General Julio Sanchez Vargas charges that North Korea trained a group of young Mexicans in terrorism and guerrilla warfare and returned them to Mexico to establish a "Marxist-Leninist regime."

Mar. 17—The Mexican Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. is called home for consultation.

Mar. 19—5 Soviet diplomats are ordered by the Mexican government to leave Mexico as soon as possible.

**NEW ZEALAND**

Mar. 17—Prime Minister Keith Holyoake announces that New Zealand will withdraw her 131-man artillery battery from South Vietnam at the beginning of May.

**NORWAY**

Mar. 2—Premier Per Borten announces the resignation of his coalition government after he says that he accepts responsibility for the disclosure of a confidential report on Norway's negotiations with the Common Market.

Mar. 10—King Olav V asks Trygve Bratteli, leader of the Labor party, to form a minority government.

Mar. 18—Premier Trygve Bratteli delivers a speech to the *Storting* (Parliament); his Cabinet assumed office yesterday.

**PAKISTAN**

Mar. 2—Martial law is established in Dacca, East Pakistan, following looting and arson in the wake of a general strike in East Pakistan called to protest the postponement

of the opening of the National Assembly.

Mar. 5—President Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan, in a radio broadcast, warns against the secession of East Pakistan and says that the postponed session of the National Assembly will open on March 25.

Mar. 6—Sheik Mujibur Rahman, the East Pakistani nationalist leader and head of the Awami League, calls a halt to the general strike.

Mar. 8—B. A. Siddiqui, the Chief Justice of the High Court in Dacca, refuses to swear in the new military governor for East Pakistan appointed last week by President Yahya in West Pakistan.

Mar. 9—East Pakistani government officials refuse to work for the martial law authorities assigned by the central government to rule East Pakistan.

Mar. 15—Sheik Mujibur Rahman says he is taking over the administration of East Pakistan.

President Yahya arrives in Dacca to study the situation in East Pakistan.

Mar. 21—Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the dominant West Pakistani political leader, arrives in Dacca and confers with President Yahya; Sheik Mujibur Rahman also confers with the President.

Mar. 22—President Yahya again postpones the National Assembly; he meets with Sheik Mujibur Rahman and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

Mar. 25—Sheik Mujibur Rahman calls a one-day strike for March 27 to protest reported firing on the East Pakistani population by West Pakistani troops.

Mar. 26—Fighting breaks out in several cities in East Pakistan, and a radio station broadcasts a proclamation of independence after the Pakistani Army tries to reimpose the authority of the government.

Mar. 28—Conflicting reports on the situation in East Pakistan are received; reports from India say that the nationalist radio in East Pakistan reports that a provisional government, headed by Major Jia Khan, has been installed. Major Khan is described as Commander in Chief of the forces of Bangla Desh (the Bengal nation).

Mar. 29—Pakistani government reports claim

that order has been restored in Dacca and that military forces have gained control in East Pakistan; reports of heavy fighting in other cities continue.

## POLAND

Mar. 3—Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński, the Roman Catholic Primate of Poland, meets with Premier Piotr Jaroszewicz; it is the first top-level meeting between church and government leaders in nearly 8 years.

## PORTUGAL

(See also *Zambia*)

Mar. 3—A lawyer defending 10 persons charged with having links to the Angolan nationalists withdraws; he accuses Lisbon's Criminal Court for Political Affairs of "violation of principles of liberty and the rules of evidence."

Mar. 5—The Portuguese Foreign Ministry releases a note accusing Zambia of responsibility for the kidnapping of 11 civilians of Portuguese nationality in Mozambique 7 weeks ago. 5 of the 11 are still missing; 1 died and 5 are said to have escaped.

Mar. 8—A government communiqué says that saboteurs destroyed aircraft and caused other damage at a military air base in central Portugal this morning.

## SIERRA LEONE

Mar. 23—Brigadier John Bangurah, the army commander, deposes Prime Minister Siaka P. Stevens; Bangurah is then arrested by senior army officers who wish to keep Stevens in office.

Mar. 28—Armed forces from Guinea arrive in Sierra Leone at the request of Prime Minister Stevens; Stevens says that he requested the Guinean troops to aid loyal army men in restoring law and order.

## SPAIN

Mar. 15—Spanish police announce that they are holding 40 persons alleged to be members of the Basque revolutionary movement, ETA.

## SWEDEN

Mar. 10—The government introduces legis-

lation intended to end a 38-day walkout by almost 50,000 civil service employees; the emergency legislation would bar strikes and lockouts until April 25.

## SYRIA

Mar. 13—Lieutenant General Hafez al-Assad is proclaimed President following a referendum yesterday; he will serve for 7 years. General Assad has been Premier since the ouster in November, 1970, of the radical Baathist party leadership.

## TURKEY

Mar. 4—4 U.S. airmen, stationed in Turkey, are kidnapped by political extremists who demand \$400,000 ransom.

Mar. 5—A student and a Turkish soldier are killed when students exchange fire with troops trying to search a university dormitory for the 4 missing U.S. airmen.

Mar. 8—The airmen are released by their abductors; the Turkish and U.S. governments had refused to negotiate with the kidnappers, members of the Turkish People's Liberation Army.

Mar. 12—Premier Suleyman Demirel resigns after receiving an ultimatum from the leaders of the armed forces warning of a military takeover if the government is not replaced by one strong enough to halt what is described as anarchy.

Mar. 13—Tekin Arıburun, president of the Turkish Senate, defies the military leaders and calls for a national referendum to determine the will of the people regarding the formation of a new government.

Mar. 14—Demirel, now serving as caretaker Premier, calls on his parliamentary supporters to back him and his Justice party in the present constitutional crisis.

Mar. 17—The leaders of the 4 major political parties agree to form a coalition government; government officials also announce the forced retirement of 4 generals, one admiral and 8 colonels.

Mar. 19—Nihat Erim, a middle-of-the-road politician, is named by President Cevdet Sunay to form a new government.

Mar. 26—Premier Erim names his Cabinet.

**U.S.S.R.**(See also *China*; *U.A.R.*)

- Mar. 1—The cars of 2 U.S. newsmen are vandalized in Moscow.
- Mar. 2—In Moscow, Jewish sources indicate 30 Soviet Jews have been told they will receive permission to leave the country. *Pravda*, the Communist party paper, announces reduction of prices on consumer goods that are no longer in short supply.
- Mar. 13—*Izvestia*, the government newspaper, publishes a Central Committee decree denouncing local government agencies for failing to heed the complaints of the people.
- Mar. 21—A statement in *Tass*, the Soviet press agency, assails an attack in the Chinese Communist press last week against the Soviet leadership.
- Mar. 22—*Tass* reports that in a one-day meeting the 300-member Central Committee gave unanimous approval to the main reports that Communist party leader Leonid Brezhnev and Premier Aleksei Kosygin will present to the 24th party congress.
- Mar. 23—Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Vladimir Alkhimov, in a news conference, says that trade with Communist China fell to a new low last year but that the 2 countries will triple trade in 1971.
- Mar. 30—Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the C.P.S.U., addresses the opening session of the 24th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party; the meeting is attended by nearly 5,000 party delegates and 101 foreign delegations.

**U.A.R.**

- Mar. 20—According to press reports in Cairo, the Soviet Union and the U.A.R. have signed an economic agreement for long-term industrial and agricultural development involving more than \$400 million.

**UNITED KINGDOM**(See also *Intl*, *E.E.C.*)**Great Britain**

- Mar. 1—Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Foreign Secretary, announces to the House of Commons that the present Conservative gov-

ernment, following the plan of the former Labour government, will withdraw British forces from the Persian Gulf area and will allow treaties giving Britain responsibility for the defense of the sheikdoms along the Gulf's southern coast to lapse at the end of this year.

- Mar. 5—*The New York Times* reports that the British government has offered to invest an additional \$144 million in development of the Rolls-Royce RB-211 engine.
- Mar. 6—Members of the Union of Post Office Workers vote to return to work, ending a 47-day strike.
- Mar. 17—James Prior, the Agricultural Minister, announces to the House of Commons that, in order to bring Britain more into line with the Common Market, changes will be made in the agricultural support system from one of government subsidies to one relying on import levies.
- Mar. 19—The Foreign Office announces that Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-lai has apologized to the British chargé d'affaires in Peking, John Denison, for the sacking of the British mission in 1967.
- Mar. 24—The House of Commons, in a 307-to-269 vote, approves legislation which will place British unions under legal regulation for the first time.
- Mar. 30—In the House of Commons, Chancellor of the Exchequer Anthony Barber presents the new budget which calls for extensive tax reform and reductions.

**Northern Ireland**

- Mar. 6—5 British soldiers are wounded, a civilian is killed, and 2 civilians are wounded in rioting in the Roman Catholic section of Belfast.
- Mar. 11—3 off-duty British soldiers are slain near Belfast.
- Mar. 14—British troops carry out a massive security check in Northern Ireland.
- Mar. 18—Prime Minister James Chichester-Clark, following his visit to London, announces that Britain will send an additional 1,300 troops to Northern Ireland; he refuses to meet the demands of militant Protestants for the jailing without trial of

members of the underground Irish Republican Army, an illegal group of Catholic terrorists.

Mar. 20—British Defense Secretary, Lord Carrington, and the chief of the British Army's General Staff, Sir Geoffrey Baker, urge Chichester-Clark to retain his post, but he resigns in the face of increased Protestant demands for harsh measures against Catholic terrorists.

Mar. 23—Brian Faulkner, a Protestant moderate, defeats his militant opponent in a race for the leadership of the Unionist party and thus becomes Prime Minister; he is invited by the Queen's representative to form a Cabinet.

Mar. 26—A standing committee of the Unionist party approves the election of Faulkner but is critical of his Cabinet appointments.

## UNITED STATES

### Civil Rights

Mar. 11—Whitney M. Young, Jr., executive director of the National Urban League, dies while on a trip to Nigeria.

Mar. 25—Following a meeting with a group of Negro members of the House of Representatives, President Richard M. Nixon appoints 5 White House staff members to work on a list of recommendations made by the group.

### Conservation and Pollution

Mar. 25—3 of the 4 states bordering Lake Michigan agree to accept the proposals of William Ruckelshaus, the administrator of the Federal Environmental Protection Agency, in setting thermal pollution standards.

### Economy

Mar. 19—The Labor Department reports a rise in the Consumer Price Index for February of only two-tenths of one per cent.

### Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl, Middle East, War in Indochina; Japan*)

Mar. 3—Responding to suggestions that

Henry Kissinger, President Richard Nixon's adviser on national security affairs, is more influential in shaping foreign policy than Secretary of State William Rogers, a State Department spokesman says that Rogers "has played and continues to play a decisive role in foreign policy decisions."

Mar. 4—In a televised news conference on foreign policy, President Nixon says that the allied operations in Laos have succeeded in reducing the flow of supplies from North Vietnam and thus have assured the continued withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Vietnam; he expresses hope for a continuation of the cease-fire in the Middle East; he reiterates his suggestion that the U.S. "normalize" relations with Communist China.

Mar. 8—Israeli President Zalman Shazar, in the U.S. in connection with Israeli fund-raising drives, pays a courtesy call on President Nixon.

Mar. 9—In an interview, President Nixon says that the war in Vietnam is ending and that "I seriously doubt if we will ever have another war." He cautions against neo-isolationism.

Mar. 11—The President, calling the plan inadequate, rejects the voluntary restrictions the Japanese textile industry has placed on textile exports to the U.S.; the President calls for legislation to restrict textile imports by mandatory quotas. Rep. Wilbur Mills (D., Ark.), chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, calls the Japanese plan "a meaningful accommodation."

Mar. 15—The State Department's press officer discloses that the U.S. has lifted the ban on travel to Communist China and is working through private diplomatic channels to resume the ambassadorial talks between the U.S. and Communist China in Warsaw, Poland; the last Warsaw session was held in February, 1970.

Mar. 17—According to *The New York Times*, a document prepared by the Military Assistance Command for the U.S. Defense Department indicates that the rate of U.S. troop withdrawal from South Viet-

nam has been determined more by a lack of funds than by the progress of Vietnamization or the enemy's actions.

Under Secretary of State John Irwin presents a note to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin protesting the "forcible entry" by Soviet policemen into the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. A Soviet family had sought to enter the Embassy to seek information about emigration to the U.S.

Mar. 18—A 3-judge federal court in New York declares unconstitutional sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 which bar visits to the U.S. by aliens who preach "anarchistic" doctrines aimed at the forcible overthrow of the government.

Mar. 21—800 persons demonstrating near the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., in protest of the treatment of Jews in the Soviet Union are arrested. Rabbi Meir Kahane of the Jewish Defense League is the leader of the group.

Mar. 22—In a television interview, President Nixon says that the South Vietnamese drive into Laos has furthered the goals of permitting the withdrawal of U.S. servicemen from Vietnam, insuring the safety of U.S. men in Vietnam and developing the strength of U.S. allies in the area; he cautions that the success of the Laotian operation cannot be easily assessed.

Mar. 25—In a session briefing the Senate on Middle East policy, Rogers says that the U.S. is putting no pressure on Israel to relinquish Arab territory before a peace settlement is reached.

## Government

Mar. 1—A bomb explodes in the Senate wing of the Capitol in Washington, D.C. There is extensive damage, but there are no injuries.

Mar. 2—President Nixon sends a message to Congress outlining his proposal to give states about \$500 million in largely unrestricted funds to combat crime. The program is part of the special revenue-sharing program of the President.

The Justice Department files suit in

federal district court to prevent Mississippi Governor John Bell Williams and 2 of his aides from interfering with a federally aided program of health services to the poor.

Mar. 4—In his message to Congress on the \$2-billion manpower program, part of his special revenue-sharing plan, President Nixon suggests that states and cities be allowed to use federal funds to create temporary public service jobs for the unemployed.

Murray Chotiner, a special counsel to the President, resigns.

Officials of the Atomic Energy Commission, in interviews, say that, due to federal budget cutbacks, underground nuclear tests aimed at finding peaceful uses for atomic energy will be suspended.

Mar. 5—In his 3d message to Congress on special revenue-sharing, President Nixon asks Congress to consolidate several housing and urban development programs into a \$2-billion program for urban assistance.

The Department of Transportation issues a compromise safety standard calling for a front-seat "passive" restraint system for 1974 models of passenger cars.

Mar. 6—The Federal Communications Commission announces that it has notified commercial broadcasters that they are responsible for keeping off the air any song lyrics that tend to promote the use of illegal drugs.

Mar. 9—Assistant Attorney General William Rehnquist says that the Justice Department will oppose any legislation aimed at curbing the government's ability to gather information about U.S. citizens.

A move to amend Rule 22 in the Senate is defeated by a 55-39 vote, 8 votes short of the two-thirds majority necessary to impose cloture. Rule 22 requires the consent of a two-thirds majority of the Senators to cut off debate.

Mar. 10—In his message to Congress on rural aid, President Nixon proposes the expenditure of \$1.1 billion for rural aid as part of his revenue-sharing plan.

Mar. 14—A letter sent by William Ruckel-



haus, administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, 2 days ago to Secretary of the Interior Rogers Morton is made public; the letter asks the Interior Department to hold up a right-of-way permit for the trans-Alaskan oil pipeline pending the study of environmental advantages of a route through Canada.

President Nixon allocates \$2.5 million for paying unemployment compensation to migrant workers unemployed as a result of crop failure in Florida.

Mar. 16—The Federal Trade Commission accuses ITT Continental Baking Company of making false nutritional claims for some of its products and issues orders prohibiting false advertising claims in the future.

Mar. 17—President Nixon signs a bill increasing Social Security benefits by 10 per cent; the bill also raises the national debt limit to \$430 billion and allows the Treasury Department to exceed the 4¼ per cent interest rate ceiling.

Mar. 18—President Nixon asks Congress to send \$2.56 billion in federal funds to state and local governments for the development of mass transit; the proposal is part of his revenue-sharing plan.

In a speech in Boston, Vice President Spiro Agnew accuses the Columbia Broadcasting System of staging "a subtle but vicious broadside against the nation's defense establishment" in its documentary, *The Selling of the Pentagon*, televised last month.

Mar. 22—The National Railroad Passenger Corporation, created by Congress in 1970, makes public the routes that will be available to intercity passengers after May 1; the service will be roughly half of that which is now available.

Mar. 23—In a 400-to-19 vote, the House approves a constitutional amendment lowering the voting age in all elections to 18; the measure must be ratified by at least 38 state legislatures to become effective.

30 mayors of U.S. cities meet with President Nixon to discuss urban problems.

Mar. 24—The Senate votes 51 to 46 to end funding for the development of the super-

sonic transport aircraft; on March 18, the House voted to cut off the funds.

In a message to Congress, President Nixon presents a plan for the merger of the Peace Corps, VISTA and 7 other voluntary service programs.

## Labor

Mar. 2—W. A. Boyle, president of the United Mine Workers, and another officer of the union are indicted by a federal grand jury on charges of embezzlement, conspiracy to embezzle and violation of laws prohibiting union contributions to political campaigns; another union official is charged with conspiracy and making illegal political contributions.

Mar. 25—According to *The New York Times*, Secretary of Labor James Hodgson presents proposals to President Nixon from the Construction Industry Collective Bargaining Commission; under the proposal, labor and management in the construction industry agree to accept wage and price stabilization machinery for each separate construction craft if President Nixon restores government support for union-scale wages on federal construction jobs.

Mar. 26—Cesar Chavez, leader of the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee, announces the settlement of a jurisdictional dispute between his union and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters; as a result Chavez has ordered a 30-day suspension of the boycott of lettuce grown in the Salinas Valley of California.

Mar. 29—President Nixon signs an Executive Order putting into effect the March 25 proposals made by the construction industry; the President also reinstates the Davis-Bacon Act which requires contractors to pay union-scale wages on federally funded projects.

Mar. 30—Construction union spokesmen express dissatisfaction with yesterday's Executive Order, claiming it might require fines and injunctions for wage settlements that violate the President's criteria. A statement issued by 16 general presidents of the building and construction unions

criticizes the order as "fundamentally unfair in applying strict controls to wages."

## **Military**

Mar. 3—In an economy move, the Army announces that it will shut down a number of Nike Hercules anti-aircraft missile installations by June 30; the Air Force announces that it will eliminate 3 fighter-interceptor bases.

Mar. 5—Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird announces a new program for the armed forces that will require every man to attend classes in race relations.

Mar. 7—A Defense Department spokesman confirms that new intercontinental ballistic missile construction in the Soviet Union has been detected.

Mar. 9—In his annual "defense posture statement" Defense Secretary Laird speaks of possible new Soviet and Communist Chinese strategic missiles and calls for a limited response in U.S. weapons programs.

Mar. 29—First Lieutenant William Calley, Jr., is found guilty, in a court-martial, of war crimes, i.e., the premeditated murder of at least 22 South Vietnamese civilians at Mylai in March, 1968.

Mar. 31—Calley is sentenced to life imprisonment. An appeal is to follow.

## **Supreme Court**

Mar. 8—In an 8-to-0 decision, the Court rules that employers may not use job application tests that screen out Negroes if the tests do not realistically measure applicants' job qualifications.

The Court, in an 8-to-1 decision, rules that draft exemption may not be granted to selective conscientious objectors, i.e., those young men who oppose only the Vietnam war as an "unjust war" and do not oppose all wars.

## **Territories**

### **Puerto Rico**

Mar. 11—2 policemen and a student are killed, more than 60 are injured and 6 are arrested during a riot at the University of Puerto Rico; the riot began as a fight be-

tween members of the university's Reserve Officers Training Corps and the Federation of Students for Independence and the youth organization of the People's Independence party. To the student groups, the R.O.T.C. is a symbol of the U.S. presence in Puerto Rico.

## **URUGUAY**

Mar. 2—Claude Fly, a U.S. agricultural expert who was kidnapped by Tupamaro guerrillas in August, 1970, is released.

Mar. 10—Guido Berro Oribe, Uruguay's attorney general, is kidnapped.

Mar. 23—Tupamaro guerrillas release the attorney general.

## **VATICAN**

Mar. 29—During an audience with Pope Paul VI, Yugoslav President Tito discusses the Middle East conflict.

## **VIETNAM, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (North)**

(See also *Intl, War in Indochina*)

Mar. 8—Chinese Communist leaders, including Premier Chou En-lai, conclude a 4-day visit to Hanoi.

## **VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF (South)**

(See also *Intl, War in Indochina*)

Mar. 8—*The New York Times* reports that the South Vietnamese government has enacted economic reforms aimed at reducing inflation.

## **YEMEN, PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (South)**

Mar. 13—The U.S. State Department reports that a Communist Chinese military mission has been established in Aden.

## **YUGOSLAVIA**

(See *Italy*)

## **ZAMBIA**

(See also *Portugal*)

Mar. 22—President Kenneth D. Kaunda accuses Portugal of preventing the entry of food to Zambia via Angola and Mozambique.



# AVAILABLE FROM CURRENT HISTORY

## Academic Year 1971-1972

- ☐ The American System of Justice (6/71)
- ☐ American Justice at Work (7/71)
- ☐ Improving Justice in America (8/71)
- ☐ Communist China, 1971 (9/71)
- ☐ The Soviet Union, 1971 (10/71)
- ☐ Welfare and the New American Federalism (11/71)
- ☐ Southeast Asia, 1971 (12/71)
- ☐ The Middle East, 1972 (1/72)
- ☐ Latin America, 1972 (2/72)
- ☐ Australia and New Zealand (3/72)
- ☐ Canada (4/72)
- ☐ Germany (5/72)

## Still Available

- ☐ The American Cities (12/68)
- ☐ U.S. Military Commitments in Latin America (6/69)
- ☐ U.S. Military Commitments in Europe and the Middle East (7/69)
- ☐ U.S. Military Commitments in Asia (8/69)
- ☐ Black America (11/69)
- ☐ Latin America (2/70)
- ☐ Africa (3/70)
- ☐ The Nations of the Pacific (4/70)
- ☐ The Atlantic Community (5/70)
- ☐ U.S. Resources: A Tally Sheet (6/70)

**ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION:** 1 year, \$9.50; 2 years, \$18.50.

**NINE-MONTH SUBSCRIPTION:** \$7.95

**SEVEN-MONTH STUDENT SUBSCRIPTION:** \$5.95.

**SPECIFIC ISSUE PRICE:** \$1.00 per copy; 10 or more of the same issue, 65¢ per copy.

**CURRENT HISTORY ANNUAL PRICE:** \$2.45

**BINDER PRICE:** \$3.50

**CURRENT HISTORY** • 4225 Main Street • Philadelphia, Pa. 19127

- ☐ Copies of Current History Annual, 1971, at \$2.45 each.
- ☐ Copies of Current History Annual, 1970, at \$1.95 each.
- ☐ Current History Binders at \$3.50 each.
- ☐ Please send me the issues I have indicated above in the quantities I have marked.
- ☐ Send me ..... 9-month subscriptions.
- ☐ Send me ..... 7-month subscriptions.

**SPECIAL SUBSCRIPTION OFFER:** your choice of 3 free issues.

- ☐ 1 year \$9.50, plus 3 free issues marked above.
- ☐ 2 years \$18.50, plus 3 free issues marked above.

Name .....

Address .....

City ..... State ..... Zip Code .....

- ☐ Check enclosed.
- ☐ Bill me. Add 50¢ for Canada; \$1.00 for foreign.

All these offers are good only on orders mailed directly to the published.

Specific issue price based on a single mailing address for all issues ordered.

5-71-4

- ☐ America's Polluted Environment (7/70)
- ☐ Options for a Cleaner America (8/70)
- ☐ Mainland China, 1970 (9/70)
- ☐ The Soviet Union, 1970 (10/70)
- ☐ Urban America (11/70)
- ☐ Southeast Asia, 1970 (12/70)
- ☐ The Middle East, 1971 (1/71)
- ☐ Latin America, 1971 (2/71)
- ☐ Africa, 1971 (3/71)
- ☐ Japan, 1971 (4/71)
- ☐ East Europe, 1971 (5/71)

## CURRENT HISTORY ANNUAL, 1971

... A day-by-day, country-by-country review of the events of 1970, adapted from *Current History's* "Month in Review," is indexed in a single volume as a service to our readers. It also contains the index to twelve 1970 issues of *Current History*.

## CURRENT HISTORY ANNUAL, 1970

... Still available.

## CURRENT HISTORY BINDER

... A sturdy, hard-cover binder at a reasonable cost to protect *Current History* for permanent reference. The easy-to-use binder holds 12 issues securely in place over flexible steel rods. Each issue of *Current History* can be placed in the binder every month, to preserve your file of this handbook of world affairs. A thirteenth rod is included to secure the *Current History Annual*.

CH 2-72 RLH 5-29-69  
 AMBASSADOR COLLEGE  
 LIBRARY-MRS DWAYNE CANUP  
 BIG SANDY TEXAS 75755